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Chapter 1: Framework of the project 
 
Introduction 
The 17th June 2004 in the rural areas of FATA in Pakistan, Nek Mohammad, a local Taliban 
commander, was killed by a hellfire missile along with five-seven other people, thought to be 
members of the Taliban (Mazzetti 06-04-2013). The missile was fired from a drone or, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicle as its official title is and was operated by a CIA operator from a safe distance in 
Langley, Virginia (Abé 14-12-2013). If a bystander saw the agent working, he would probably 
assume that he was playing an ordinary video game, when in fact, the enemies on the screen were 
real-life targets in Pakistan (Graham 2009: 398). Sources claim that besides Nek Mohammed, up to 
three of the killed were known Taliban targets and two of the targeted were children aged 10 and 
16. Even though this strike has not been the first example of a drone strike conducted by the U.S., it 
was however the first to take place in Pakistan (Mazzetti 06-04-2013). Since this attack in 2004, 
there have been 368 confirmed drones strikes in the FATA region of Pakistan, killing between 
2537-3533 people out of which 411-884 is estimated to have been civilian casualties (The Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism 2013). 
 
The use of drones in warfare is a topic widely discussed and increasingly criticised both in 
academic and public circles. Drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), are machineries which 
make it possible for soldiers working in U.S. to conduct operations far across the globe by the use 
of live video feeds and remote control. Drones come in many forms, but some of most controversial 
ones are the Predator and Reaper drones, which have the ability to carry Hellfire missiles. This has 
changed the usage of drones from intelligence gathering to lethal combat (Hasting 2012 & Airforce-
Technology 2013). Drones have made it possible for the U.S. to kill their targets in the combat 
zones of Afghanistan and, increasingly, the borderlands of Pakistan, without risking the lives of 
their soldiers. The U.S. conductance of drone-strikes are not restricted to a single geographical 
location or combat zone, but are utilised in multiple countries where the U.S. is engaged in military 
operations, including Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan (Bureau of Investigative 
Journalism 10-08-2011). 
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The drones in Pakistan are, unlike most military hardware, not operated by army personnel, but by 
CIA operatives working in a war that is officially not taking place (Gregory 2011a). This poses a 
paradox in that officially and legally, the U.S. is not at war with Pakistan, yet they still utilise 
drones in the targeting of Taliban and Al-Qaeda members. Therefore, the drone strikes in Pakistan 
constitute a part of the first ever known "CIA-war" (Gregory 2011a: 241) and are primarily centered 
along the Afghan border, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (i.e. FATA) of 
Northwestern Pakistan (Rogers 02-08-2012). This is also where Nek Mohammad was targeted. Due 
to the lack of government authority, the region is perceived by the U.S. to be a “safe haven for 
terrorists” and is therefore regarded as “the most dangerous places in the world” (Obama 2009). 
However the region of FATA itself poses a rather remarkable paradox as it has never been 
considered an entirely integrated part of the state of Pakistan in that it has always had a great deal of 
regional autonomy and independence from the Pakistani state (Shaw & Akhter 2012). 
This northwestern area of Pakistan has been named one of the primary problem areas in the Global 
War on Terror. Its close ties with Taliban and other "terrorists" is widely regarded a security issue 
not just for Pakistan's stability, but for the stabilisation of Afghanistan and succeeding of the war 
there (Williams 2010 & Rashid 2012). FATA has become a security issue for not just South Asia 
but the entire world, and thereby perceived to pose a very real threat to U.S. and global security 
(National Security Strategy 2010). 
 
We see the drone strikes in FATA as a situation which cannot easily be explained by conventional 
IR-theory. Firstly, even though the U.S. constitutes a Great Power which gives them unique 
privileges in the international arena (Donnelly 2006), the drone strikes could still be seen as a 
breach of the sovereignty of Pakistan and a violation of the principle of non-interference (Holsti 
2004: 161ff), since the Pakistani state has not officially given acceptance to these military 
operations (Wire 25-05-2013). During our theoretical research of trying to understand the situation 
in FATA we found the “New Wars” theory. “New wars” is based upon the idea that a change has 
occurred since the end of the Cold War era in how war is conducted and on which terms. The old 
state vs. state-wars has been replaced by more complex conflicts of intrastate and state vs. non-state 
actors. Both types of wars open up to new discussions of themes such as identity, sovereignty, 
borders and the practical conductance of warfare. With the drone strikes in FATA being conducted 
by the strong state of the U.S. against terrorists in the specific region of FATA in Pakistan, without 
the agreement of Pakistan, this seems to pose questions very relevant for the assumptions of the 
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“New Wars”-school; That this is a certain type of “New War” contesting traditional state-on-state 
warfare, with a new technology of drones transgressing traditional limits and concepts of what war 
truly is. On this premise we want to examine how the concept of “New Wars” can help explain our 
questions concerning the drone strikes in Pakistan. 
 
Problem statement 
How is the concept of “New Wars” evident in the US drone campaign in the FATA region of 
Pakistan? 
 
Elaboration of Problem statement 
In order to acquire a more academically founded understanding of how the American drone 
campaign in FATA, Pakistan, is an example of the concept of “New Wars”, we have chosen four 
tendencies based in this theory, which will be the focus of our analysis. These tendencies will serve 
as analytical tools in our approach to the empirical case of the drone campaign in FATA. 
Subsequently, we will use these tendencies to describe the perceived implications which these 
tendencies hold for the stability of FATA, where the drone strikes take place. Lastly we will, based 
upon our new insights/cognitions, take on a critical approach to the concept of “New Wars” in order 
to examine the perceived “newness” of the concept of “New Wars”.  
We will start by describing the theory and the methodological tools we are using, before elaborating 
on how our project is designed. 
 
Methodological grounding 
To answer our problem statement, we will use constructivism and the method of qualitative text 
analysis, through which we will examine the political context surrounding the U.S.’ conduction of 
drone strikes in Pakistan. Here we will go through what constructivism is but, more importantly, 
how we use it. We have found constructivism meaningful given the complex nature of our empirical 
case of FATA and the drone strikes, which we see to defy generally accepted paradigms and 
dogmas within the political, military and geographical landscape. Our constructivist approach 
enables us to answer our problem-statement and thus to understand what constitutes the drone 
strikes in FATA and unfold the complex nexus between the U.S, the Pakistani state and the region 
of FATA. 
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According to constructivism, the world is constructed by physical entities (Fierke 2010), 
geographies therefore are constructed physical entities separated by borders which are constructed 
in nature but consist of perceived limitations. This means that states are states because social actors 
construct them this way, which also helps to highlight how a state like Pakistan might be perceived 
as one physical entity, yet contain social and political internal incoherences, which is important in 
understanding how the drone strikes can defy the sovereign borders of the Pakistani state. 
What is important for constructivism are the ideas and beliefs social actors as inter-subjective 
perceptions in people or groups, meaning that reality is constructed by social actors perceptions of 
what is real, not an objective truth "out there" to derive. However, this does not mean that the world 
is changeable by will, because the perceptions of social actors are very compact. It does however 
mean that the only way we can gain knowledge is to look at what social actors construct the reality 
to look like. It also means that any "reality" is context specific and that what is “real” are not 
universal laws, but rather understandings of specific contexts which might defy what is more 
generally perceived to be “true” about how the social reality is constituted (Fierke 2010 & Jackson 
& Sørensen 2010). 
We will furthermore use a social constructivist epistemology when examining whether the U.S. 
drone-campaign in Pakistan constitutes a new way of conducting war. We gain knowledge through 
the social actors of the arena which we are examining, however, we are also agreeing that not all 
ideas are equally right, and we therefore have an emphasis on explaining the drone-campaign in 
FATA (Fierke 2010) - not just understanding it, which can only be done through a recognition that 
some constructions are more true than others - in our case we perceive the specific local context of 
FATA is more true than the “Global War on Terror” as an idea and the paradigm of the drone 
strikes; that killing is more real than the intention it was done with. We will use qualitative text 
analysis in understanding what constitutes the drone strikes in FATA, what remains the underlying 
norms and perceptions of the use of drones, and what is perceived to be the goal of such campaign? 
In this we also see that language is an important aspect of a constructivist analysis because it reveals 
the perceptions of social actors (Fierke 2010), and examining the language of the U.S. agenda will 
therefore constitute a part of our analysis of the drone-campaign. Moreover, we use the 
constructivist epistemology in understanding the consequences the drone strikes have for the FATA 
region which they are targeting through opinions of the social actors i.e. the population of FATA. 
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Furthermore, we will use the insights gained in constructivism to deconstruct some of the perceived 
dogmas of warfare and sovereignty. We will move beyond the assumptions of what constitutes 
“war” - how is it done, who is the enemy, where is it done, and who is it done by? We will question 
these assumptions through our case of the drone strikes in Pakistan which, we argue, expose a fairly 
unique case through which it becomes evident that traditional warfare is merely a construction and 
that in specific cases war is exposed as something which defies traditional perceptions. 
 
Selection of theory 
Our theoretical framework consists of the thoughts of Stephen Graham & Derek Gregory, who both 
engage in the concept of “New Wars” and how the Global War on Terror is an example of this. 
As the name implicates, the “New Wars”-school emerged from the notion that the nature of warfare 
has changed since the end of the Cold War; the conflicts following that period, e.g. in Africa and 
Eastern Europe, did no longer match the notions of conventional warfare; non-state actors such as 
insurgencies, militias and (religious groups) are inferior in terms of weaponry but have yet proven 
difficult for the strong state militaries to defeat (Schuurman 2010). 
The “New Wars” school of thought is therefore an attempt to explain those changes. The concept of 
“New Wars” breaks with the conventional definition of warfare; wars are no longer only fought 
between states´ military, but exceedingly between state and non-state actors, which renders the new 
type of warfare asymmetrical (Kaldor 2005: 4 & Graham 2006: 271). 
Professor Mary Kaldor is regarded as one of the founders of “New Wars” theory. Her theoretical 
standpoint is centered around the notion that the concept of New Wars is to be regarded as a change 
in the methods of warfare, the goal, and how it is financed (Kaldor 2006:7), and is rooted in the 
process of globalisation. The goal of “New Wars”, she believes, “are about identity politics in 
contrast to the geo-political or ideological goals of earlier wars” (Kaldor 2006:4). She does not 
consider the Global War on Terror as a “New War”, but argues that it resembles “old” wars, just 
with the use of new technology (Kaldor 2005:3). From her point of view, technology is not essential 
in the conceptualisation of warfare. As already mentioned, what matters, is why the war is 
conducted and by whom. 
 
This perception is not shared by Graham and Gregory in their theories. While they both agree with 
Kaldor that the methods and goals define the concept of “New Wars”, they also both emphasise the 
technological progress as a very central symptom of “New Wars”, as well as they also both see the 
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Global War on Terror as an example of conductance of “New War” (Gregory 2011a & Graham 
2006). 
As our problem area revolves around the use of drones in the context of the Global War on Terror, 
we find that the theories of Graham and Gregory are well-suited to expound our problem area in the 
context of the “New Wars”-theory. Furthermore, both Graham and Gregory take their point of 
departure in a geopolitical understanding of the concept “New Wars”, which we regard as useful 
considering that our chosen case, FATA, poses a variety of geopolitical complexities. Both Graham 
and Gregory's works is very much inspired of constructivism, in that they deconstruct and challenge 
the generally accepted notions of what constitutes war, how the involved actors perceive each other, 
and also the notion of geography and the importance of borders. Their theories are founded in 
empirical material, including the drone strikes in Pakistan, and it has therefore proven challenging 
to discern their theoretical points from their empirical analysis. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Both Graham and Gregory have through their writings touched, either directly or indirectly, upon 
many of the thoughts, concepts and academical themes that are an integrated part of our problem-
statement. We have chosen their theories, as we believe the theories both align and supplement each 
other. This has enabled us to derive four main tendencies. 
We use their theoretical framework as an academic compass as well as a guideline for our project; 
however we also plan to move beyond and possibly challenge some of the narratives that they 
outline in their writings. This is done through our methodological framework as well as critical 
perception of their ideas as perceived through our empirical data. 
In order to explain the drone strikes conducted in the region of FATA, we take on a constructivist 
approach inspired by the theories of Graham and Gregory. Their point of departure is constructivist 
geopolitics. A central notion of Graham´s thoughts centers on the concept of “cities as battlespace” 
and of “military urbanization”. These are theoretical concepts and therefore not limited by 
geographical constraints, why we find them applicable to the region of FATA. Furthermore, 
Gregory’s theoretical point of an “everywhere war” breaks with the classical notion of wars being 
fought within a battlefield. Both notions entail the “New Wars” concept, that warfare has assumed a 
new geopolitical character.   
Our theoretical foundation in the ideas of Graham and Gregory has enabled us to derive four main 
tendencies which we perceive as especially important to understand the concept of “New Wars”, 
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namely; improved technology, a changed enemy definition, sovereignty and national borders 
become less important and there is a blurring of the lines between the military and the civil society. 
 These tendencies, which will be introduced in this chapter, will form the basis of our analytical 
framework. Moreover, we complement and challenge the ideas of Graham and Gregory with other 
theoretical views to improve the understanding of our empirical material. 
 
Four main tendencies of new types of warfare 
We have derived four tendencies from the works of Graham and Gregory, which we find are 
fundamental for changes which constitute their concepts of “New Wars”. These four tendencies will 
serve as guideline for our analysis and are described below. 
 
1) Improvement in technology 
According to Graham and Gregory improved technology alters some of the fundamentals of how 
war is conducted. Social actors perceive progress in technology to be causing improvements in 
efficiency thus resulting in, ultimately, changing how we conduct warfare. We do believe the 
drones to constitute such a catalyst for progress. (Graham 2011:141). 
 
2) A change in what defines an enemy, away from a state centric view. 
The concept of what constitutes the enemy has changed. An enemy is not necessarily a 
geographically limited national group; it can also be a transnational group consisting of non-state-
actors such as "terrorists", perceived to threaten the everyday life of civilians far across the globe. 
(Graham 2006: 257) 
 
3) Sovereignty and its territorial boundaries become less important. 
This means that sovereign borders are not meaningful geographical constructions through which to 
approach “New Wars”, as they are conducted "somewhere else" (Gregory 2011a). Both Graham 
and Gregory describes this as a change from “battlefield to battlespace”, where a battlespace is 
characterised by a lack of geographical delimitation as well as a weakening of the line between 
combatant and noncombatant (Graham 2009). 
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4) Blurring of lines between the military and the civil society 
Both Graham and Gregory argues that in “New Wars”, the line between what constitutes military 
and civil society is no longer strictly defined, but has been a blurred interconnected issue, through 
which the rules of war are no longer as clearly defined (Gregory 2011a; 241)  
 
Selection of Empirical Data 
Here we will briefly describe our main empirical data. However, we use a more thorough net of 
different empirical and empirical/theoretical materials than highlighted here, which can be fully 
accessed in the Bibliography-section. 
The foundation of our understanding of FATA lies in a number of main reports: “Understanding 
FATA” by Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme (CAMP) 2012, a Pakistani NGO 
working in FATA to produce annual reports about the region (CAMP 2012). “Living Under 
Drones”  by the International Human Rights Resolution Clinic on Stanford University and Global 
Justice Clinic on NYU School of Law, which has a rather critical view on the drone strikes’ 
consequences for FATA (Living Under Drones 2012). The International Crisis Group’s 2006-report 
on “Pakistan’s Tribal Areas” and “Civilian Harm and Conflict in Northwestern Pakistan” by the 
Campaign for Innocent Civilians in Armed conflict, another US-based NGO critically assessing the 
consequences of the drone strikes (International Crisis Group 2006). These presents us with a 
throughout understanding of the complex context in FATA. 
 
To gain an understanding of the U.S. state’s perceptions in the Global War on Terror we have used 
their “National Security Strategy”`s from 2002, 2004, 2006. Moreover, we have used the 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual produced by the US Army and Marine Corps in describing to 
what end the drones strikes are being employed: both which are representing the U.S. conducted 
drone strikes and US led Global War on Terror. 
 
Empirical framework 
We see the drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan as an interesting case, and are interested in whether 
they pose an indicator of what Graham and Gregory would call “New Wars”. We have chosen the 
geographical area of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (henceforth: FATA) which are part of 
the Northwestern region of Pakistan, through which we examine the concept of “New Wars”. Our 
Global Studies S2013 
Camilla Marta Giordano, Ida Ørum Groth, Lise Karlshøj Ipsen & Morten Arnfast Jansen 
 11 
problem statement concerns the drone strikes in Pakistan, and since the drone strikes here are 
centered on the region of FATA, we chose this as our empirical case. FATA in itself also poses a 
very interesting case; the area has served as a “buffer-zone” throughout history, a sort of pawn in 
the power game of strong states, and thus it seems that FATA is still affected its past: 
 
“The Pakistani state, following its imperial predecessors, has actively created FATA as an 
exceptional region: an aberration that exists outside of the state’s constitutional laws. This process 
of judicial abandonment, an old colonial performance, has created a volatile landscape that in turn 
produces conditions conducive for international intervention”(Shaw & Akhter 2012:1504). 
 
FATA is structurally and traditionally so different from Pakistan that it can be argued whether it is 
marginalized to such an extent that renders it questionable whether it is a truly integrated part of 
Pakistan, except when considering the official state borders - an aspect which we will examine 
further in our analysis.  We therefore believe that FATA´s complexity and the relationship between 
FATA and the Pakistani state can be used as leverage to understand the American drone strikes, and 
are thus important tools in our analysis. FATA will then be the material which is both 
complementing and challenging the theoretical assumptions from our main theoreticians. 
 
We have chosen not to conduct a field trip to FATA but do instead rely on a wide spectrum of 
comprehensive data, including statistics about the population, interviews, observations, qualitative 
reports and official documents. The material is written by different agents, but also websites and 
strategies are amongst our empirical data. We have mainly chosen material with a critical approach 
to the drone strikes in Pakistan, because we did not wish to reproduce the conventional logic of the 
U.S. and its Global War on Terror-allies. We have focused mainly on reports coming from 
independent agents. It has also been important for us to approach the drone strikes from a multitude 
of views, and we are therefore using a wider array of reports to grasp the complex body of 
perceptions which affect and reflect the context. This is evident when we use U.S. National Security 
Strategies and military strategies, which reproduce the perceptions from the U.S., yet give us 
insights into how the enemy is perceived by them. 
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Delimitation 
Through the project there are several aspects which touch upon themes that relate to our problem 
statement but which we do not examine in the project.  
 
Even though we recognise and analyse aspects of how the drone strikes in Pakistan affect the 
sovereignty of Pakistan, we will not go into the political consequences for the relationship between 
the U.S. and Pakistan. This is very complex in itself and beyond the scope of this project to answer. 
Furthermore, we do not examine the consequences of the drone strikes on the local social dynamics 
of the FATA-region and its population. Our main interests lies in the drone strikes, and though the 
local dynamics might gain insights into the context, the amount of valid empirical data necessary to 
answer this would be hard to come by given FATA’s  geographical and economical situation. Lastly 
we will not touch upon the juridical aspect of the drone-strikes, which we recognise the importance 
of, yet it constitutes a separate complex situation which deserves to be explored more thoroughly 
than this project would allow. 
 
Description of the project design 
Taking our point of departure in our problem statement and methodological grounding, we continue 
to the analysis with which we answer our problem statement of how the concept of “New Wars” is 
evident in the U.S. drone campaign in the FATA region of Pakistan. As explained earlier we have 
derived four important tendencies of “New Wars” which forms up the basis of our analytic 
framework. Even though we see these four tendencies as separate aspects of “New Wars”. We have 
sorted these four tendencies in a cognitive order which consequently composes the order they are 
approached in the project.   
We perceive the tendency of technology as forming a basis of the concept “New Wars” in that it is 
generally perceived as a catalyst of change, and also, it is the most physical and therefore salient 
“tendency”, which makes for a good starting point. Furthermore we find that the tendency of a 
changed enemy definition underpins many of the arguments in new perception of sovereignty, and 
the concept of the enemy should therefore be approached first. Lastly we see the tendency of the 
blurring of lines between military and civil society as an immanent aspect. We see it as a tendency 
which contains aspects from the three other tendencies. After analysing how the four main 
tendencies are evident in the drone strikes in Pakistan, we will engage in a discussion concerning 
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the “newness” of the concept “New Wars” as it is evident in the drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan. 
How new are the tendencies found in the drone strikes in Pakistan really? We will endingly sum 
this up in our conclusion of how the concept of “New Wars” is evident in the U.S. drone campaign 
in the FATA region of Pakistan.   
Projectdesign
 
 
 
Overview of Chapters 
Chapter 2 
In this chapter we will focus on the technology of drones. Through the theories of Graham and 
Gregory’s “New War” we see technology as one of the catalysts for the changes to “New Wars”. 
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This chapter will focus on an analysis of the drones. What are they capable of? What are the 
implications of this technology? And how do they conduct war? The chapter will be empirical 
founded in descriptions of the drone technology, and the military strategies of kill/capture and 
counterinsurgency which are employed in the Global War on Terror generally, and specifically in 
FATA. Moreover, we will look at the command and striking procedures which are employed by the 
drones in Pakistan. We will compare this to the theoretical notions of Graham and Gregory, to gain 
a critical understanding of what the implications of the drone technique are for the conductance of 
warfare. 
 
Chapter 3 
In this chapter we will focus on what Graham and Gregory see as a change in how the enemy is 
perceived in the so-called “New Wars”. This will be done by analysing the articulation of the 
enemy of the drone strikes in FATA as an extension of the Global War on Terror-campaign. This 
articulation is primarily derived from the U.S. National Security Strategies from 2002, 2006 and 
2010, however is complemented by the notion of “insurgents” as found in the U.S. military 
counterinsurgency-strategy. We will critically examine what constitutes the “category” of the so-
called “enemy” and compare this with the local population context in FATA, to answer what the 
concept of the enemy is, and how it compares with that concept found in Graham and Gregory’s 
writings, and conclusively, what we can learn about the “target” of the drone strikes from this 
analysis. 
 
Chapter 4 
Here, our focus is on Graham and Gregory’s notions of how “New Wars” defies the traditional 
notions of territorial borders. Our empirical material lies in the unique context of the local region of 
FATA; both historical and socio-political. Here we will use a wide range of different reports and 
studies made of this particular area and the drone strikes herein. We will use the insights which we 
have gained about the context of FATA and the drone strikes, to analyse how the concept of “New 
wars” is evident in the way the drone strikes are conducted in FATA, how this relates to the borders 
of the region, and how this relates to the perceptions of Pakistan as an entity 
 
Chapter 5 
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Chapter 5 will be an analysis of what Graham and Gregory perceive as the blurring of lines between 
military and civil society. This will be done by analyzing the implications for society and the 
conduction of war caused by the change from the military to a civil intelligence agency as the 
conductor of military operations. 
The obtainable empirical material on how the drone-campaign in FATA is conducted is limited. 
 We will use the empirical material we have obtained regarding the changed command-structure of 
the drone strikes, its targeting-procedures and the few articulations of the drone-campaign we have 
found, in a critical evaluation of the consequences this change in who commands a military 
operation has for both the very “institution” of war and for the drone-campaign in itself. 
 
Chapter 6 
In chapter 6 we will engage in a discussion of whether the concept of “New Wars” is really new or 
if there are any inclinations of the opposite. This will be done by approaching the concept of “New 
Wars” through a critical view based upon the knowledge we have acquired through the project. To 
validate this critique, we will also draw upon other theoretical insights which might help us 
critically asses the basis of the “New Wars”-school of thought. In other words, we will see whether 
there is any backing to this perceived “newness” of the “New Wars”. 
 
Chapter 7 
At last we will draw our conclusion, where we sum up on our general arguments and insights 
gained through the project. Furthermore, we will bring our “discussion of findings” where we will 
put our project’s insights into a broader perspective to see if they can be used to highlight related 
phenomena.   
 
Clarification of terms  
 
Conventional wars & old wars 
Conventional wars or “old wars” as Graham and Gregory call it, refers back to a Clausewitzian 
state-centered view of war. Conventional war is characterised by state vs. state warfare where states 
conduct wars following the rules of war, more or less, and war is defined by declarations of war and 
end with peace treaties or surrendering. Conventional wars are fought by the states with trained 
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armies, recognised government, centered command structures and military campaigns. Such a view 
of war has been dominating in the field of IR since the Napoleonic wars and has had its most 
obvious example in World War 1 (Holsti 2004). In the project, when we refer to “Old wars” or 
conventional wars it is with this definition in mind.  
 
Militants, insurgents & terrorists  
In the project we use the words “insurgents” and “militants” in order to describe the groups of 
people which are targeted by the U.S. in (e.g.) Pakistan. It should be clarified that these notions 
refer to the same group of people, even though we see the term “insurgents” from a more military 
angle, than the term “militants” which strictly refer to groups or movements which use violent 
measures in attaining their means or is somewhat keen to utilise violence. However, we do not see 
this as a necessarily negative-term more than any other grassroot movements which utilise violence 
or extreme activism in order to attain their means. “Terrorists” is the category in which these groups 
are collectively placed by the U.S.. However when we use this term we see it as a reflection of the 
U.S. perception of these groups, which is one (dangerous) collective target through the Global War 
on Terror. Therefore we prefer the terms “militants” and “insurgents” in order to gain a more 
nuanced view upon what really defines these groups without reproducing the U.S. agenda. 
 
Terrorism 
The question of what defines terrorism is a complex academical and empirical discussion which is 
still contested across the world. A generally accepted definition is therefore difficult to come by. 
However in this project we have followed the U.S. definition of Terrorism as it is the U.S. who 
articulates their enemies as terrorists, and, as mentioned above, we only use the term in relation to 
the U.S. perception of these groups. They define terrorism as;  
 
“the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-
combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents;” (US Gov. 2012).  
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Chapter 2: Technology in “New Wars” 
 
Introduction 
In this section we will examine the concept of “New Wars” through the writings of Gregory and 
Graham, by analysing how the “New Wars” tendency of technology is evident in the drone 
campaign in Pakistan, but we will also touch upon other aspects of the term “technology”. 
We will argue that the invention of drones with lethal capabilities constitutes a change in 
technology and has changed some of the fundamental aspects of warfare. We will analyse how 
drones have changed the kill/capture in the counterinsurgency-campaign upon which the U.S. led 
Global War on Terror is based, and the implications thereof. This will be done by analysing how 
drones have changed the way enemies are defined through targeting procedures and how they have 
led to changes in command structure. Furthermore, we will engage in an analysis in how drones 
have resulted in both a dehumanisation and humanisation of its targets, as well as a change to a 
asymmetrical warfare and what this implies for the population targeted in FATA. As this chapter is 
mostly a discussion of the technology of drones, the analysis will be centred more around what 
drones are and do rather than their consequences on Pakistan, which we will dwell on in the next 
chapters.   
 
Technology in New Wars 
Both Graham and Gregory argue that since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 the world has experienced a 
globalisation of war in the sense that war is no longer defined by geographical front lines but is 
everywhere and embedded in every aspect of society. Consequently, danger is now an everyday 
concept, inducing that “[...] parked vans, delayed trains, envelopes with white powder, people with 
packages, ‘Arab’-looking people, colds and flu, low flying aircraft, electricity outages, stacks of 
shipping containers, computer glitches, IT viruses, and subway derailments, are now sources of 
mass anxiety.” (Graham 2006: 261). Graham argues that in order to respond to these new security 
threats, the state is reliant on new technologies to collect, analyse and process increasing amounts of 
data  and utilise them in taking preventive action against these new threats (Graham 2006: 271). 
Graham describes this induced surveillance of the US “homeland” with reference to a doctrine of 
former Vice President Dick Cheney, stating that militarisation and securitisation is now boundless 
because the whereabouts of “terrorists” and thus the target-zones are expanded from the homeland 
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to anywhere “terrorists” might be. The doctrine’s caused response to such “terrorist” threat is the 
preemptive aggression by the US Military, emphasising the use of ” [...]‘long war’ targeting 
‘terrorists’ [...]” (Graham 2006: 262). 
Gregory puts more emphasis on how, through these “New Wars” of the 21st century, the role of 
information and technology has become an increasingly important aspect of war. Gregory uses two 
examples to underline his notion: Firstly, he notes the U.S.´ acknowledgement of the increasing 
influence of social media in its shaping of a conflict, secondly he mentions the revolution in 
military affairs (RMA), that a revolution in military technology brings with it new types of warfare. 
According to Gregory, an implication of the RMA is that “[k]illing is made to appear objective and 
objectifying, executed in the service of Truth and Reason.” (Gregory 2010: 160). In other words, the 
new technology of RMA brings with it a sense “objective truth and reason” in its conductance. This 
new technological way of engaging in war allows for the troops on the ground so be substituted 
with: ”advanced systems of sensing and surveillance from air and space platforms, systems of 
information management, and weapons systems revolving around pilotless aircraft, robotic vehicles 
and precision-guided weapons in order to project what the Pentagon calls ‘full spectrum 
dominance” (Gregory 2010:160). Or as Graham puts it: ”The new military urbanism’s second 
foundation is the fusing and blurring of civilian and military applications of control, surveillance, 
communications, simulation and targeting technologies.” (Graham 2011:141). 
 
In summary, in “New Wars”, technology plays an increasing role in both the conductance of war 
and preemptive operations. The notion of Graham and Gregory is that evolution in technology is 
one of the factors which has altered the very way war is conducted. We will use this theoretical 
notion in analysing whether drones, as employed in the drone strikes-campaign in Pakistan, 
constitute an example of such. 
 
What is a drone? 
The concept drones can be traced to the First World War where remotely piloted aircrafts were 
used, and later during the Vietnam War where the first extensive use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 
as drones are also called, were (Gregory 2011b: 189). New developments in technology have meant 
a revolution in the appliance and capabilities of these Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. (Gregory 2011b: 
205). 
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A drone is a remotely controlled aircraft which, through sensors and live video feeds, enables the 
pilot to control the aircraft from the ground and even from a great distance. Drones were originally 
used for surveillance purposes, but with the application of Hellfire missiles to the aircraft, came the 
lethal drones (Gregory 2011b: 196); the two drones known to be carrying missiles are the Predator 
MQ-1B and its big brother the Reaper (Ackerman 2010). These drones are able to stay in the air for 
a tremendous time, and with the great distance within which they can be controlled, it minimises the 
risk for the pilot, as he/she is not in the battle zone. Due to these obvious advantages, the drones 
have become a widely used tool in the U.S. led Global War on Terror, and especially in the U.S. 
counterinsurgency effort in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (FATA) (The 
Bureau of Investigative Journalism 2013). 
 
How drones are strategically employed in FATA 
Counterinsurgency, or COIN, constitutes the main U.S. doctrine of the Global War on Terror. The 
doctrine is the overarching logic of the military operations aiming at fighting off perceived 
terrorists, e.g. via the drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan. COIN represents the most important 
doctrine of the War on Terror and so the strategy has implications far outreaching the scope of the 
drone-campaign in Pakistan. It constitutes a standard set of measures utilised in military actions 
against insurgents or the more politically charged enemy of “terrorists”. COIN targets the 
phenomenon of "[...] political actors that use asymmetrically violent means to attain their 
ideological ends" (Jones, Smith & Stone 2012: 599). However, counterinsurgency dramatically 
differs from how war is generally perceived e.g. in the view on what constitutes a “victory” and 
how this is best obtained. COIN emphasises the importance of making the enemy realise that his 
interests are best served in supporting the counterinsurgency-campaign and thus opposing the 
insurgency. This support is gained by socio-economical and political stabilisation and build-up of 
local structures, which, consequently, undermine the very foundation from which insurgency 
occurs. That is, insurgency is a result of local underlying grievances which should be solved by 
strengthening the society itself. Moreover, counterinsurgency-theory explicitly emphasises that 
killing insurgents as done by drone strikes will increase radicalisation and support for the 
insurgency (Jones, Smith & Stone 2012, Sitaraman 2009 & US Army/Marine Corps 2006). This 
strategy constitutes a general antithesis to the strategy of Kill or Capture, or Kill/Capture. The 
Kill/Capture-Strategy, we will further argue, is immanent in both the lethal drones and, moreover, 
the very way that the drone-campaign is executed in FATA.  
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Kill/Capture-strategy constitutes a “relic” from conventional warfare; that is, wars between states 
with official armies and the wider aim of either destroying the enemy or forcing it to surrender, and 
thus constitute the general blueprint of warfare. This tactic aims at destroying the capabilities and 
human resources of the enemy whilst making the surviving part paranoid enough to deter its effort 
or fighting capability. Overall, in the strategy lies an acceptance of civilian casualties which are 
unfortunate (Sitaraman 2009: 1748ff). But civil casualties constitute a lesser evil - especially in the 
eyes of the public - than a military occupation or even a successful terrorist attack (Porter 2009: 
301). The objective of the strategy can also stretch to destroying material resources and the moral of 
the enemy until the enemy will either collapse or surrender, because war is seen as an interplay of 
the military, the population and the government (Sitaraman 2009: 1751ff). Kill/Capture is a strategy 
often employed in the Global War on Terror (Sitaraman 2009: 1748) and although it might not 
comprise the most pronounced part of the utilised military strategy, we will argue that it is very 
widely used, especially in the drone strikes which apply the strategy of containment combined with 
Kill/Capture - that is, the operation starts by tracking and identifying the targets and afterwards 
killing or severely injuring them. We argue this because the entire technique of lethal drones 
revolves around its capability of striking down targets with the highest precision possible. Even 
though drones are just a method, a military hardware, we argue that they, particularly in FATA, use 
of drones have an immanent inclination towards a Kill/Capture strategy, without the possibility of 
“capturing”. 
We further argue that counterinsurgency (the overall strategy of the Global War on Terror) and the 
strategy of kill/capture are two very different approaches. What should be done in order to gain 
“victory” is exceedingly different in the two; the first emphasises the importance of building trust 
locally and winning over the hearts and minds of the community, whilst the other emphasises the 
importance of defeating the enemy. Therefore, when we claim that the drone-campaign in Pakistan 
embodies a kill/capture strategy, but constitutes a part of a broader counterinsurgency doctrine. We 
are also aware that these two strategies mutually undermine each other. We do however, not see this 
counter-productivity as undermining the employment of drones in warfare, rather, it is a condition 
for their existence. 
 
Changes in targeting procedures 
The implementation of drones has enabled a constant stream of real time video and audio 
information transmitted directly to the command center or to the soldiers on the ground without 
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putting the lives of the pilots at risk. This transformation from time-consuming intelligence 
gathering to real-time intelligence being transmitted to the battlefield has fundamentally altered the 
way military operations can be utilised (Gregory 2011b). The success of any military operation is 
based upon the amount of reliable information available, in the sense that the more you know of 
your target where it is and the situation surrounding it, the greater your chances of taking it out. 
With the use of drones, the amount of reliable up-to-date information has increased. and so, we will 
argue, the improved technology of drones has resulted in an alteration of the targeting procedures. 
The targeting procedure of drones in FATA (and elsewhere) is based upon two separate methods, 
the so-called "Signature strikes" and "Personality strikes"; "Personality strikes" embody drone 
attacks on high-value targets; "known" targets which are confirmed by U.S. Intelligence to be part 
of a condemned "terrorist" group (Hastings 2012: 5). However, “Signature strikes” are more 
commonly used in the drone-campaign. “Signature strikes” employ the real time information of 
drones in order to establish whether a person or group on the ground is a potential “terrorist” and 
therefore a potential target. This decision is based upon a series of parameters such as if the target(s) 
behave(s) “suspiciously” or if he or his surroundings act like they could be “terrorists” (Hastings 
2012: 5). The decision is therefore based upon the possibility of the target being a “terrorist”, rather 
than determining the identity of the intended target before a course of action. We claim that this 
new targeting procedure would not have been possible, or at least as widespread as it is today, 
without the information capabilities provided by the technology of drones. 
We will argue that this development in technology, especially regarding high-precision strike 
capabilities and the subsequent development of the “signature strike”-targeting procedure, has 
resulted in a change in the success rate of a given strike. In conventional wars with its more or less 
defined battle zones, uniformed combatants and rather imprecise targeting technology (artillery, 
aircraft bombers etc.), the problem was to confirm whether the intended target was hit. However, in 
the drone-campaign in Pakistan, the problem is reversed. The problem is not whether the 
technology is capable of striking the intended target, rather, the question becomes whether the target 
hit in fact is an enemy - or just behaving like one. We argue that hit confirmation is instantly 
available through the technique of the drone. Therefore, the success rate of a strike is instead 
measured by whether the target was actually part of an insurgent group or a civilian, or in other 
words, whether it was a legitimate target. 
Another way in which drones have changed the concept of kill/capture is in the so-called “kill-
chain”. As Gregory argues (Gregory 2011b: 196), the combination of intelligence capabilities and 
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high-precision firepower combined in the Reaper and Predator drones have effectively removed 
several “links” in the command structure of the so-called kill-chain - the process, or chain of 
command, between locating a target to initiating a strike is shortened (Hebert 2003). In previous 
wars, such as the Second World War and the Cold War, the kill-chain was linear, meaning that a 
target was predetermined and identified firstly, and the process from this to executing an actual 
attack could take days or weeks (Gregory 2011b: 196). However, the drone technology has reduced 
the operational time from when the “enemy” is identified, to when a lethal operation can be 
undertaken, into a matter of minutes. The drones constitute a technology embodying both the 
conductance of strictly intelligence and strictly military operations; two different operations which 
would normally take time to consolidate. Furthermore, the distance between the pilot and the drone 
entails removal of risk for the pilot who is not physically a part of the battle. We argue that this has 
also resulted in the possibility of employing drones in combat zones that were previously deemed 
too dangerous for the pilot. Based upon this, we can assume that drones have instigated an 
optimising of the kill-chain regarding to the number of command-links which have to be consulted 
before a strike can be initiated. Based upon this notion we surmise that this optimisation has 
resulted in an increase in the number of Kill/Capture-missions, due to the absence of risk for the 
pilot conducting the operation. This is based upon the assumption that the costs of a Kill/Capture 
mission as the potential loss of pilots has been reduced, whereas the potential benefits of a mission, 
the elimination of “terrorists”, is not affected by the use of drones, it might even be optimised 
because of the improved technology. Based upon this argumentation we see it rational that an 
operational commander would be more inclined to issue Kill/Capture missions using drones, than 
he would with ordinary aircraft, resulting in an increase in Kill/Capture mission.  Furthermore we 
also argue that the use of drones could possibly result in an increase in the decision to kill a target 
rather than capture it. The basis of this argument is that a capture-mission requires substantial more 
resources, including the presence of ground troops in often hostile territory, thereby putting their 
lives at risk - or at least this would be the case in FATA. This could cause an inclination in the 
Kill/Capture strategy as utilised in FATA, towards the “kill”-part, as the option to kill only requires 
confirmation from along the kill-chain in addition to the push of a button from the drone operator, 
rather than resources being spent on ground troops capturing the target. This is obviously further 
emphasised in that the technology of drones cannot capture targets - only exterminate them. 
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Asymmetrical warfare 
Graham argues that the implementation of new technologies, such as drones, has led to a shift in the 
balance of warfare. This is not only to be understood in the context of the new war capabilities 
which a drone provides, but rather in a shift in the costs of war. By using drones remotely controlled 
from over 8000 miles away (Graham 2006: 270) the risk for the pilot has been removed. However, 
this does not apply to the “enemies” that still risk their lives on the battlefield. We see this as 
aligning with Graham’s notion of (new) asymmetrical warfare: 
“This new ‘generation’ of war is based, they argue, on ‘unconventional’ wars, ‘asymmetric’ 
struggles, ‘global insurgencies’ and ‘low intensity conflicts’, which pit high-tech state militaries 
against informal fighters or mobilized civilians” (Graham 2011: 138, quoting Hammes 2006: 3). 
This side-effect of the technological change is also evident with the drones in Pakistan. The costs of 
the “war” for the U.S. can be assessed as economic and equipment loss, given that a drone is “just” 
a piece of military hardware which can be replaced, whereas the militants on the ground (e.g. the 
Taliban and Al-Qaeda) risk losing their lives as a consequence of the drone attacks. This rather 
extreme form of asymmetrical warfare is only made possible by the usage of the drone technology. 
 
Dehumanisation 
We will argue that even though the drone campaign does not constitute a strategy in itself but is 
merely a method; it is part of a dogma, a paradigm, which is described by Amoore and de Goede as 
"a dream of side-effects-free precision targeting in an otherwise unruly territory." (Amoore & de 
Goede 2011: 200). The idea that war can be conducted without unwanted side-effects such as 
civilian casualties, increased radicalisation, riots and other consequences usually associated with 
combats in conflict-filled and disorderly areas. It is a paradigm of target-specific warfare with low 
levels of civilian casualties, where war is conducted effectively and problem-solving in conflict-
areas, and only impacts those who are part of the conflict. Within this paradigm, drones are a 
perfect military merchandise as they can be send into conflict-zones without the risk of losing 
soldiers and with digital precision exterminating the target(s) - and only the target(s). Yet this is 
more dream than reality, as most researches show that numerous civilians have fallen victim of 
drone strikes (Roggio & Mayer 2013) 
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  Akhter & Shaw  argue that drone strikes strip their targets of their "humanity" - they are suddenly 
nothing more than a target on a screen of squares and grids; as the drone is "inhumane" - so 
becomes its target; drones dehumanise their targets and essentially their victims (Akhter & Shaw 
2012). We will argue that the drones are subject to the same rational instrumentalism as COIN, 
meaning that drones are perceived as rational actors capable of picking out their targets without 
such human disposition as empathy, doubt and (unrightfully) mercy, thus they become “true” 
rational and apolitical actors of conflict arenas (Jones, Smith & Stone 2012). Herein also lies that in 
drone strikes, the targets are stripped of the possibility of fighting back; the hardware fighting them 
is nothing more than a hardware, and so they cannot cause human destruction on their opponent as 
they would be able to do in any traditional combat. Though the hardware of a drone constitutes a 
military investment of the military which is unfortunate to lose, the loss of it does not cause great 
grievances in the home-country because no soldiers' lives are lost in combat. It is - so to say, a one-
sided war. 
Both Graham and Gregory engage in the discussion of the potential dehumanisation-effects of 
drone warfare. As formerly mentioned, some scholars see the drones as dehumanising in essence. 
We will further highlight this argument by the employment of “Signature strikes”, which demean 
the targets into parameters of likelihood that he or she is a “terrorist”. Graham finds it resembles 
video games: “[...] this ‘virtual’ work is almost indistinguishable from a‘shoot-’em-up’ video game 
[...]” (Graham 2006: 270), causing a great distance between the pilot’s act of killing and the actual 
killing because he cognitively perceives the act to be a video game. This is further highlighted by 
the task of the drone operator which to some resembles playing video games (Graham 2006: 270).  
Gregory however disagrees with the notion of drones causing an increased dehumanisation in 
warfare. He argues:“Contrary to critics who claim that these operations reduce war to a video 
game in which the killing pace appears remote and distant, I suggest that these new visibilities 
produce a special kind of intimacy that consistently privileges the view of the hunter-killer, and 
whose implications are far more deadly.” (Gregory 2011b:192). 
 
Gregory’s notion is that the drones produce a new form of intimacy, because the technique allows 
for the drone operator - or conductor of war, to see the actual killing up close, and not from a 
distance as with conventional weapons. Also, the very nature of video games causes the players to 
be completely absorbed by the game: “Yet video games [...] are profoundly immersive, drawing 
players in to their virtual worlds, which is in part why the US military uses them in its pre-
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deployment training.” (Gregory 2011b: 198). The operators are very well aware that the operations 
are real, that there is no reset button, and that death observed is still death (Gregory 2011b: 198). 
Also, the drone operators seem to develop post-traumatic stress disorder more profoundly and at 
faster rates than conventional soldiers, further emphasising that the drones does not, just, produce a 
dehumanisation, but also a humanisation, and increased intimacy between the drone operator and 
his target(s) (Akhter & Shaw 2012 & Gregory 2011B: 198). 
However, we do not believe that there is a simple answer to the question of whether the use of 
drones entails a humanisation or dehumanisation of the targets. We argue that the use of drones 
both dehumanise and increasingly humanises the targets at the same time. On one hand, the drone 
operator is conducting the strikes from behind a computer-screen, thereby becoming a faceless 
enemy to the ones attacked. Also this distance between the conductor of the attack and the target 
produces a dehumanisation. However, on the other hand, a new - and very much one sided - 
intimacy is produced. The drone operator is in a way very much closer to his target, and drawn into 
the battle-zone more intensely, as he is not just able to count the freckles on the target’s face before 
the strike, but also the destroyed limbs after the attack. The drone-campaign is thus both 
dehumanising and producing a new form of intimacy between the conductor and the target. 
We argue that drones are essentially all of these things. Drones are lethal target-precision 
machineries of war, they are of kill/capture-strategic weapons of a counterinsurgency-campaign, 
they are inhuman dehumanisers and humanisers, which produce a new kind of intimacy between the 
drone operators and the target(s), and are employed because of their potential for "side-effect free" 
combat. They are, indeed, conflicting in nature. 
 
In this chapter we have examined whether the ideas of  the “New wars” concept are evident in the 
case of FATA, Pakistan through the changes provoked by the implementation of drones, and 
whether the use of drones has instigated a change in how warfare is conducted in the FATA region.  
Drones have made it possible to conduct strikes on perceived enemies without risking the lives of 
soldiers, and as seen in the case of FATA, they enable the U.S. to engage in war - without actually 
being at war with the state of Pakistan, affirming Gregory´s notion of an “everywhere war”. The 
war is then rendered asymmetrical, because the “terrorists” are no match against the drones. But 
while the risks of the ones controlling the drone are eliminated, it is not a perfect tool in the attempt 
to “win” a war.  
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As we have seen, the main doctrine on the U.S. War on Terror is counterinsurgency, while the 
drone strikes campaign is conducted according to Kill/Capture - without the possibility of capturing. 
As we have argued, these strategies do not align, because how is a strategy which attempts to “win 
hearts and minds” compatible with one that is based on eliminating the enemy? Moreover, the 
utilisation of drones has consequently shortened the kill-chain, decreasing the time needed from 
locating af target to killing it. We do see these tendencies as aligning with Gregory and Graham’s 
concept of “new “wars” in that the drones constitute a high-precision weapon resulting in an 
asymmetrical war between those who utilise drones and those who fall victim of them. 
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Chapter 3: The changed enemy concept 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter we will compare Gregory and Graham's notion that the concept of “New Wars” 
entails a changed concept of the enemy with the specific context of the drone strikes in Pakistan, 
FATA. FATA is perceived as a target for the Global War on Terror, but who are the targets and can 
they be understood through Gregory and Graham's notion of a changed concept of the enemy?  
We will examine the National Security Strategy of the U.S. and the military strategy employed in 
the Global War on Terror in order to derive how “the enemy” is conceptualised by the U.S., as we 
believe that we thereby can derive what constitutes the enemy in Pakistan, FATA. Subsequently, we 
will examine how the concept of the enemy is contextualised in the drone-campaign conducted in 
FATA and the implications thereof. 
 
The conceptualisation of the enemy in the National Security Strategy  
The National Security Strategy defines the U.S. foreign policy strategy and is released every fourth 
year. We have examined the strategies of 2002, 2006 and 2010 in order to depict how the U.S. 
articulates current national security threats. As the drone strikes in Pakistan constitute a part of the 
U.S. led Global War on Terror-campaign, we will argue that the concept of the enemy as expressed 
in the National Security Strategy must reflect the U.S. perceptions of what constitute their current 
enemy globally. As the drone-strikes in Pakistan are part of U.S. foreign policy and considered a 
response to a national security threat, we argue that the concept of the enemy found in the National 
Security Strategy must align with the enemy targeted in Pakistan. The drone strikes in Pakistan are 
further viewed as an extension of the conducted "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan and 
the enemy is thus seen as the same as the one U.S. is fighting in Afghanistan (Williams 2010:871-
873). Moreover, Afghanistan constitutes a tremendous part of the object of the National Security 
Strategy throughout the 00's, which further underpins our argument that the perceived threat 
described in the National Security Strategy is the same as the one targeted in FATA, Pakistan. 
 
As we will argue, the National Security Strategy outlines a fundamental change in how the enemy is 
perceived. The Cold War-period emphasised an enemy coming from the Soviet Union and the war 
was fought over ideology; liberalism vs. communism, as was World War II against the Nazis. The 
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enemy comprised a number of states of a different ideology, and the logic answer to this threat 
became the use of deterrence (National Security Strategy 2002: 13).  
 
This notion has changed in US Security Strategy; now wars are not fought over ideology, but "over 
religious, ethnic, and tribal identity" (National Security Strategy 2010: 1), and increasingly, the 
enemies are not states of ideology, but rogue states - or since 2006, so-called weak states. In U.S.´ 
perception, rogue states brutalise their own people, disregards international law, acquires weapons 
of mass destruction, sponsor global terrorism, reject basic human rights "[....] and hate the United 
States and everything for which it stands" (National Security Strategy 2002:14) and are thus one of 
the greatest threats to U.S. security in the beginning of the 21st century. 
The other great enemy of U.S. foreign policy is that of “terrorism”, as terrorism targets civilians and 
aims at maximal destruction which “compels US to action” (National Security Strategy 2002:15). 
As quoted in the 2002 Strategy: "The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists 
of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The 
enemy is terrorism—premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against innocents." 
(National Security Strategy 2002: 5) 
As seen, terrorism is very much described as the new enemy of the U.S. This presents both a change 
of the perception of the enemy and a paradox; the enemy is not a regime, person, religion or 
ideology - yet the war is over religious, ethnic and tribal identity. Already here it becomes evident 
that what the U.S. is fighting is rather ill-defined as a war of identity; the US "[...] will wage a war 
of ideas to win the battle against international terrorism." (National Security Strategy 2002: 6), 
"[...] for it is ideas that can turn the disenchanted into murderers willing to kill innocent victims" 
(National Security Strategy 2006: 9). In this perspective, ideas, not identity, define whether one is 
enemy or ally; friend or foe, depending of having the "right" idea. In relation to this, the U.S. 
perceives some states as "weak states" and these pose a risk of becoming a safe haven for terrorists, 
making them a potential threat and thus linking the risk of weak states to that of terrorism (National 
Security Strategy 2002, 2006 & 2010). 
 
“Them” vs. “us” 
We will argue that the language of the National Security Strategy depicts dichotomies; it defines the 
world in black and white; friend and foe; ally and enemy; "Either you are with us or you are with 
the terrorists" (Bush 2001). We will therefore go through some of the main dichotomies to describe 
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how the U.S. perception of the enemy creates a distance between the “terrorists” and “the rest of 
us”. 
 
One of the most used dichotomies is that “freedom” and ”terrorism” are antithesis to each other. 
“Terrorist” detest freedom and thus freedom should be used to fight terrorism; the strategy 
"counters a bankrupt agenda of extremism and murder with an agenda of hope and opportunity" 
(National Security Strategy 2010: 4). When articulating what defines the concept of “terrorism”, the 
language clearly seeks to demean it: “terrorists” are “spawned” rather than born, and they are “at 
large” in the same way that wild animals are, and they “seek to destroy”, as if terrorists, as beings, 
are more violent and brutal by nature and, lastly, they "advocate a perverse vision based on 
violence and destruction" (National Security Strategy 2006: 10).  
 
This is in strong contrast to the U.S. which is perceived as the defender of freedom and security; the 
U.S. “intend to build” (National Security Strategy 2010: 6) - as opposed to “terrorists” who seeks to 
destroy. The U.S. policy according to the 2002 National Security Strategy is to make sure that "[...] 
terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide;" (National Security 
Strategy 2002: 6). It seems that the U.S.´ agenda is clear in defining “terrorism” as the main threat 
against U.S. and its allies; against the lifestyle of the western sphere. 
As mentioned above, in the 2010 National Security Strategy the concept of the enemy changes - 
from a notions of a "war on ideas" it becomes a “war on identity”. This rather vague notion is 
furthermore specified to be a war on specific “terrorist networks”, the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
(National Security Strategy 2010: 20). The enemy is concretely the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, since 
"the frontline of this fight is Afghanistan and Pakistan, where we are applying relentless pressure 
on al-Qa'ida, breaking the Taliban's momentum, and strengthening the security and capacity of our 
partners" (National Security Strategy 2010: 4). This shows why Pakistan has been marked a target 
area of the Global War on Terror, and also why the enemy is perceived to be inside the Pakistani 
territory.  
However, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban cannot be understood as one compact group or movement with 
one distinct goal. Yet we do not believe that the U.S. is blind to the fact that Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
are not one or two definite groups, but the articulation of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban as such 
constitute, we believe, a strategically important point. The enemy is defined as one compact entity 
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well-knowing that it is not so, which strengthens the idea of a common enemy of the U.S. and all it 
stands for.  
 
As seen, the conceptualisation of the enemy in the National Security Strategies is somehow 
indefinite; it is  not founded in different ideologies, though different ideas turn people into an 
enemy. Then the enemy has a name - Al-Qaeda and Taliban, and the war is one of identity. As we 
have argued, the language of the National Security Strategy depicts the world in black and white, 
which serves to create a distance between the perceived enemy and “us”, making the actual (vague) 
denomination of the enemy a secondary matter. In the following section we will contextualise this 
enemy perception theoretically by applying the theories of Graham and Gregory. 
  
Graham & Gregory´s concept of the enemy 
Both Graham and Gregory consider the changed concept of the enemy as a feature of “New Wars”. 
They both seem to consider the changed concept of the enemy as a sub-argument to that of the 
borderless geography of New Wars - how it is conducted both nowhere and everywhere to which 
we will devote our next chapter. However, we do believe that the changed concept of the enemy 
deserves to be placed more centrally in defining what constitutes “New Wars”, as the enemy 
remains a target of any military operation. The enemy, as seen above, is placed at the core of the 
entire agenda of the Global War on Terror which have inspired much "New Wars"-thinking 
including both Graham and Gregory, and it also remains the enemy - or at least a concept of an 
enemy that is targeted through the drone strikes. 
 
To start with a central argument in both the works of Graham and Gregory, the concept "New 
Wars" embodies that the states increasingly seek to target non-state actors instead of other states 
which was a feature characterising conventional war: 
"The focus of mobilization is thus no longer focused within delimited geographical or temporal 
spaces of ‘symmetrical’ state versus state warfare. Instead, it becomes increasingly unbound in time 
and space. Thus, state power seeks to target ‘asymmetric’ non-state forces and movements to the 
point where contemporary ‘warfare’ becomes effectively ‘coterminous... with the space of civil 
society itself’" (Graham 2011:138). Graham calls this the fourth generation of asymmetric warfare, 
defined by high-tech state militaries fighting against "informal fighters or mobilized civilians." 
(Graham 2011:138). In asymmetrical warfare, Graham claims, the target is not state-military, but 
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the civil society, because the targeted movements and non-state parties constitute a part of civil 
society itself. Due to this logic, some places, particularly "Arab cities have been imaginatively 
constructed as little more than 'terrorist nest' targets to soak up US military firepower" (Graham 
2006: 256). Hence any city (or place) can be articulated as a "nest for terrorism" and thus be 
considered a legitimate target of New War. This is for instance how Pakistan is framed in the 
National Security Strategy 2010: "[T]he frontline of this fight is Afghanistan and Pakistan, where 
we are applying relentless pressure on al-Qa'ida, breaking the Taliban's momentum, and 
strengthening the security and capacity of our partners" (National Security Strategy 2010: 4): Thus 
Pakistan becomes a nest for terrorism which needs to be "freed" from this burden. This is also 
evident when the U.S. marks the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan and thereby 
FATA “ the most dangerous place in the world ” (Obama 2009). 
 
According to Graham, the Global War on Terror is mutually constructed between “terrorists” and 
the “U.S. homeland”, an Othering where the U.S.t distance themselves from the “terrorists”; a form 
of alienation (Graham 2006: 271). This dynamic constitutes an imaginative geography (Graham 
2006: 256), where the "borders" between us and them is imagined - it is constructed. They become 
"two mutually exclusive, mutually constitutive, classifications:" (Ibid.) and define themselves 
according to the other, something which is indeed evident in the National Security Strategy as 
highlighted prior in this chapter. This imaginative geography is, according to Graham, the 
foundation for War on Terror, it constitutes its very fabric; its inner logic.  
 
We argue that the Global War on Terror, as evident in the US National Security Strategy, on this 
aspect corresponds much with the enemy-concept of "New Wars"; following this optic, we could 
not have a Global War on Terror without the severe alienation of "terrorists" as a perceived "other", 
inconsistent with a world the “freedom and peace” that US is perceived to represent. This is the 
constructed logic around which New Wars revolves. 
 
Who are "they"? 
Why does this constitute a problem? Both Graham and Gregory emphasise how this one-
dimensional definition have real consequences for real people, because who are "they"? We see the 
concept of enemy as exceedingly ill-defined both in US National Security Strategy as well as in 
theory, an argument which we will elaborate in the following section. 
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What identifies the concept of the enemy of "New Wars" is that it is "[n]on-uniformed and largely 
indistinguishable from the mass of the city [...]" (Graham 2009: 388). The city is here Graham's 
entity from which he understands warfare; however, we see that the city could be any inhabited 
specific geographical area, so it could as well be the local region of FATA, a view which we will 
indulge in through the next chapter. Graham's notion is that within the concept of “New Wars” 
cities, not states, are targeted, because cities are inhabited by the non-state actors which are sought 
fought. This is even evident in the National Security Strategy 2002 which specifies that an enemy 
can be both state actors and non-state actors (National Security Strategy 2002).  
 
However, the targeting of the cities inhabited by “terrorists” uncovers a practical difficulty in 
distinguishing "terrorists" and "insurgents" from the general civilian population (Graham 2011: 
139). When nobody is wearing uniforms, how to tell who are the "terrorists" and who are 
"civilians"? Terrorists are in practice indistinguishable and thus blend in with the locals, which 
causes any military-campaign which aims at targeting terrorists, to end up targeting everybody, and, 
consequently, "permanently treat all urban residents as perpetual targets whose benign nature, 
rather than being assumed, now needs to be continually demonstrated" (Graham 2009: 393). That 
is, the population of the entire city becomes a potential threat and is thereby treated as such. 
 
This is very evident in FATA, Pakistan, where the entire population has increasingly been viewed 
as a "threat". Obama has previously called FATA “one of the most dangerous places in the world” 
(Obama 2009) underpinning our argument that it is, indeed, not just the so-called "terrorists" 
residing in FATA who are considered threats, but the entire region which constitute a more or less 
“perpetual threat”. This is even more evident as many sources assess that the number of civilian 
casualties of the drone strikes has far outreached that of targeted terrorists (Gregory 2011b: 241 & 
Living under Drones 2012: vii): it is the entire region which is targeted by the drone-strikes, not just 
the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. 
 
However, even to distinguish that two different categories of "civilian" and "terrorist" exist is 
problematic, because in a city which is perceived to be U.S.-hostile, which is which? This point is 
highlighted by Gregory as an exploitation of "another grey zone, the space between civilian and 
combatant that is peopled by the spectral figures that haunt the landscape of insurgency" (Gregory 
2011a: 242). The schism between civilian and combatant becomes blurry because they could both 
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be seen to constitute the mass of "insurgency"; As a majority of 86 % of FATA's population oppose 
the US military activity in the region (CAMP 2012: 86), everybody could be perceived as 
"insurgents” by the U.S.. Yet, the target of the Global War on Terror remains "insurgency" through 
counterinsurgency policies (Jones, Smith & Stone 2012), despite the fact that the targeted 
population constitutes a mass of both civilians and combatants and a large grey-zone of in-between. 
 
In the following section we will examine the concept of “insurgents” and how it aligns with the 
changed concept of the enemy in “New Wars” and our empirical case FATA. 
 
U.S. Counterinsurgency doctrine - who are the insurgents? 
Here we will examine what constitutes the "insurgents" that the Global War on Terror - including 
the military operation of the drone strikes, seeks to target. How do they define insurgents and how 
does this correspond with the "blurred" concept of the enemy in "New Wars" as highlighted by 
Graham and Gregory?  
 
The current US doctrine of the Global War on Terror is that of counterinsurgency (COIN). The 
doctrine is the overarching logic of the military operations aiming at fighting off terrorists e.g. via 
the Drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan. COIN represents the most important doctrines of the War on 
Terror - and modern asymmetrical warfare in general, and so the strategy has implications far 
outreaching the scope of the individual operation. We will look at both the official strategy by US 
Army & Marine Corps (2006) and a critical analysis of the same strategy by Jones, Smith & Stone 
(2012), whilst comparing to our theoretical framework and our case of FATA. 
 
Generally COIN is a standard set of measures utilised in military action in the struggle against 
insurgents. It has been widely adopted by the Global War on Terror as the measure against 
transnational terrorist networks. COIN can thus be characterised as the strategy of counterterrorism 
- whereas the strategy of counterterrorism tends to focus more on the ideological drivers of 
terrorists, the military operations remains guided by COIN, and both COIN and counterterrorism 
targets the very same phenomenon of "[...] political actors that use asymmetrically violent means to 
attain their ideological ends." (Jones, Smith & Stone 2012: 599).  
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However, as a doctrine consists of standard measures, it also runs the risk of trying to standardise 
conflicts instead of tackling them through their specific context, and COIN is no exception. COIN is 
more concerned with means rather than the groups and individuals they are targeting and the 
political and socio economical context in which they are operating; COIN's focus is methodological 
rather than contextual. This is very evident in its vague conceptualisation of what constitutes 
"insurgents"; the thing that they are fighting:"Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized 
movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and 
armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-
military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, 
occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control. 
Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions 
taken by a government to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02)." (US Army/Marine Corps 2006: 1-1). 
 
This is the official description of what constitutes an "insurgency", that is, the very objective of 
counterinsurgency, and thus one of the conceptualised enemies of the Global War on Terror. And 
whilst this might seem to hit the nail on the head in terms of defining the U.S. perception of a 
"terror threat", it is indeed wide in its scope and does not seem to contain any specific details in 
regard to what identifies the enemy. The very notion of insurgency, as highlighted by Gregory as a 
“grey zone between civilians and combatants” (Gregory 2011: 242) does in relation to the official 
strategy provoke a blizzard of questions of the difference between the legitimacy and illegitimacy of 
governments, occupying powers, political authority, organised movements, and which measures 
that are utilised in order to categorise an action as “designed to weaken the control and legitimacy” 
(U.S. Army/Marine Corps 2006: 1-1) of such. It becomes a question of who is in power and who 
has the power to define who are weakening their control and legitimacy, and how far-reaching a 
given action has to be in order to be a "design of weakening" such legitimacy. Moreover, it is 
unclear what exactly defines an “established government, occupying power, or other political 
authority” (U.S. Army/Marine Corps 2006: 1-1) as this definition seems to embody more or less 
any authority from dictatorship to democracy, legitimate or not. 
 
It is not to say which parameters can be used in identifying "insurgents" that do not include 
everyone who is opposing any form of authority. This does however correspond with Graham's 
argument that "New Wars" involves a permanent treating of everybody in "the city" as a potential 
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threat: in Graham's view, the consequence becomes that "[...] nothing [in asymmetric warfare] can 
be defined outside of boundless and never-ending definitions of political violence" (Graham 2009: 
392). Everybody is potentially violent, and violence can potentially erupt everywhere, hence, the 
policy of “New Wars” is to guard and prepare against such threat.  
 
In this light, the COIN-doctrine seems rational because its flaws are reflecting this boundless nature 
of violence, however, we will argue that this also contributes to the blurring of the concept of the 
enemy and thus makes it exceedingly opaque what or whom the “New Wars” are targeting and 
why, because how does this apply to FATA? 
 
The Enemy in FATA 
To understand what constitute the enemy targeted through the drone-campaign in Pakistan, we will 
dwell on the complex context of the local region FATA to derive who the main enemies are and 
which "grey zones" are evident locally: who are the "combatants" and who are "civilians"? 
Even though FATA is formally a part of "Pakistan", the population does not enjoy the same rights 
and privileges, and are therefore already excluded from the broader Pakistani society (International 
Crisis Group 2006: i & Zaidi 2010: 1-5).  
 
We will in the following argue that the population of FATA constitutes a grey-zone in Pakistani 
society. In relation to this exclusion, there are no regular police or courts to be compared with the 
Westphalian states, instead FATA is based on a semi-autonomous system of tribal leaders (CAMP 
2012: 21-22). Administratively, FATA is divided into two jurisdictions; protected areas and 
regions, which are under the administrative control of the Federal Government's Political Agent 
(PA) and unprotected areas which are administered through the local tribes of different Pashtun 
families of the specific communities. The PA is the only government actor who has any control 
over the region, yet this control is very comprised in one single government authority, and is 
executed in cooperation with the tribal leaders of FATA: a system upheld in the Pakistani 
Constitution of 1947 (CAMP 2012: 22). 
 
There is a very widespread militancy in FATA (CAMP 2012: 93-100) Militancy is often viewed 
negatively as illegitimate militia, however, in a region with no regular executive powers it seems to 
be a fairly logical way of maintaining law and order. Moreover, militancy - the act of engaging in 
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warfare and thus the idea of the importance of militant reforming, lies at the heart of Pakistani 
identity both within and beyond FATA, and we believe it to be an important factor in understanding 
FATA and should not be seen with such reservations (Gardezi 2010 & CAMP 2012: 93). It can be 
argued that militancy in FATA has evolved as a response to the lack of regular executive powers 
(House of Commons 2012:23), in other words "[t]he state's failure to extend its control over and 
provide good governance to its citizens in FATA is equally responsible for empowering the 
radicals" (International Crisis Group 2006: i): this is a widespread argument, and in this light it 
becomes evident that a widespread militancy in FATA is a reaction to the lack of good governance 
from the Pakistani state ( Ibid.).  
 
However, the U.S. counterinsurgency and, even more so, the drone-campaign seek to target the 
militant insurgents. Yet if militancy is to be regarded as a substitute for the lack of regular executive 
powers, there does seem to be a grey-zone, because what constitutes the "legitimate militancy" and 
"illegitimate militancy", respectively? And do the drone strikes actually target both - thus removing 
the provider of law and order?  
 
This would be a logical conclusion to draw, however there is also evidence that the Taliban residing 
in FATA also harassed the tribal leaders opposing their mission, thus making the drone-strikes 
targeting of Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders a welcomed initiative in combating Taliban and Al-
Qaeda's increasing attempt at creating a sharia-state "within" the state of FATA (Williams 2010: 
883). We will not go into these conflicts between Taliban and Al-Qaeda and FATA's population, 
however with this we do wish to show that the specific political context of FATA is a blurry picture 
of differing affiliations and objectives - not the coherent entity which it is often perceived to be. 
We do see the landscape of militant groups in FATA to be a murky picture of insurgency - a diverse 
image of U.S.-hostile groups but with different legitimacy and different goals within which makes it 
is hard to figure out who are the so-called "terrorists" and who are not. It is, in Gregory's words, “a 
grey zone between combatants and civilians” (Gregory 2011a: 242. Even though the drone-strikes 
are primarily targeting "known" Taliban or Al-Qaeda members, there is evidence that they have 
killed more people outside these groups than known members within (Living under Drones 2012: 
31). 
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As formerly mentioned, most of the drone strikes in FATA in Pakistan are so-called "Signature 
strikes". Signature strikes are highly controversial as they entail that the strikes are conducted based 
on the behavior of the potential targets, it "involves attacks on groups of alleged militants who are 
behaving in ways that seem suspicious" (Hastings 2012: 5). In other words, if the target looks like a 
"terrorist" and behaves like a "terrorists", it probably is a "terrorist" and is then killed by the drone. 
This further highlights the problematic enemy-concept embodied in the drone-strikes; this way of 
categorising alleged terrorists necessarily entails some form of stereotype, the strikes are conducted 
according to parameters concluding whether or not the target is likely to be a terrorist, and is thus, 
conclusively, an odds game; the targets are killed if it is likely that they are terrorists (Hastings 
2012: 5).  
 
This is extremely critical when considering FATA, as a considerable part of the population could be 
described as "insurgents" and thus meets the demands of being qualified as a "terrorist". So when 
the CIA claims that the number of civilian casualties by the drone strikes is close to zilch (Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism 03-01-2013) they could be considered right according to their own 
perceptions and classifications of what constitute a likely "terrorist" - even though this might 
include children because who can guarantee that a child will not carry out terrorism?  
 
This makes it evidently clearer that the concept of the enemy in the drone strikes is part of the same 
blurry mess which constitutes the entire targeting of "terrorists". Terrorists are both anyone and no 
one, as they are not wearing uniforms, the targeting of them must be based on assumptions of what 
constitute "a real terrorist", making it exceedingly unclear what or who the perceived enemy in 
FATA really is. 
 
The vagueness of the concept of the enemy  
A consequence of this notion of the "terrorist" as an enemy and the followed targeting is that it is 
conveniently vague - and because of this vagueness it becomes possible to coin more or less any 
grouping as terrorism: it "works to allow virtually any political opposition to the sovereign power of 
the US and its allies to be condemned as 'terrorist'." (Graham 2006: 257). It becomes a question of 
the eyes that see and labels the given group as evidently "terroristic by nature": Either as actors of 
destruction and violence as reflected in the National Security Strategies (see section: The 
“terrorists” vs. “the rest of us”), or as actors of “politico-military struggle designed to weaken the 
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control and legitimacy [...]" (US Army/Marine Corps 2006: 1-1) as highlighted in the 
counterinsurgency-strategy. In this view, any group can be condemned as "terrorist" or "insurgents" 
- from Greenpeace to Human Rights Watch, making it hard to see what constitutes the U.S. and the 
Global War on Terror's concept of an enemy. Taken to an extreme, this perspective makes it 
possible to justify political oppression through the lenses of "the fight against terrorism" and 
through the political act of differential treatment. This was evident when Pakistan first entered the 
Global War on Terror and seemed seemingly enthusiastic in eliminating many sources of sectarian 
violence, yet consequently overlooked the active militant insurgency groups residing in the 
Kashmir-region, struggling for Pakistan's acquisition of Kashmir from India, even though many of 
them, such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba, also constitute a part of the condemned "terrorists" by the 
Global War on Terror-campaign (Tellis 2008: 5). Later, in 2009, Pakistan admitted that in the past 
"militants and extremists had been “deliberately created and nurtured” as a policy for “short-term 
tactical objectives." (Subramanian 9-07-2009). 
 
 In short, the Pakistani state had been supporting insurgents in order to obtain state objectives, 
particularly concerning the Kashmir-issue, which highlights the inconsistency of Pakistani attitude 
towards the Global War on Terror and how the notion of "terrorists" is so vague that it can be bend 
in order to fit any perception. Yet, the case of preparing against a potential conflict with India has 
always been a soft-spot in Pakistan's foreign policy (Pande 2011: 28-31). Even though we will not 
go into this case or the conflict with India, this point serves to highlight that the disputed concept of 
"terrorism" both can be and is (mis)-used in condemning militants. "Terrorism" is a stamp which 
can be used in labeling certain militants as particularly "illegitimate" and thus they become targets 
of the Global War on Terror, but this labeling is an incoherent process and does not live up to any 
specific parameters, but is a political action; a construction with very real consequences. 
 
A tendency of the concept of “New Wars” is that the enemy constitutes a core part of the War; it 
becomes the inner logic around which the war is legitimised, and without a strong concept of the 
enemy, there would be no war. However, this tendency is in strong contrast with the increasing blur 
of what categorises an enemy: it becomes harder to distinguish who the enemy is and who is not, 
what constitutes the distinction between enemies and civilians, how to distinguish “them” from 
“us”?  We find this is evidently true within the context of FATA which is subject to a high level of 
militancy-identity and a murky picture of different more or less U.S.-hostile groupings with 
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different agendas. In the drone-strikes campaign, it is the entire population of FATA which is being 
perceived as a potential threat and treated as such, not just the "known" "terrorist" targets, 
confirming Graham´s notion that the enemy definition in asymmetrical warfare indeed is boundless 
(Graham 2009: 392). 
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Chapter 4: Redefinition of national borders 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have sought to explain two of four extracted tendencies which we have 
chosen in order to explain how the concept of “New Wars” is evident in the U.S. drone strikes in 
the FATA, Pakistan. We have shown how the drone strikes are an example of a new type of 
warfare, by examining how the New Wars tendencies of improved technology and the changed 
concept of enemy are manifested in FATA. In this chapter we will continue our analysis by 
examining another tendency which, according to Graham and Gregory, characterises the concept of 
“New Wars”; how national borders lose their importance based on the concept which Graham and 
Gregory call a shift from conventional wars´ notion of Battlefield, to the New Wars´ notion of 
Battlespace. We will furthermore seek to apply the theoretical understanding of the concept of 
Battlespace to the drone campaign in FATA, by examining the concept in light of the discourse of 
the Global War on Terror. As it is indicated in the U.S. National Security Strategy, the (American) 
U.S. - Pakistan Security Strategy and in the Senate’s prehearing of CIA director John Brennan. We 
will then argue that this shift from a well-defined Battlefield to a never-ending Battlespace, as it is 
evident through the drone campaign in FATA, puts a significant strain on the concept of 
sovereignty. In order to examine this New Wars tendency´s implications on the concept of 
sovereignty in Pakistan, both the historic and present context of FATA are taken into consideration. 
 
From Battlefield to Battlespace   
In this chapter, we will examine the concept of space in regards to war. What does the notion of 
space mean to the conductance of war, and in which ways is it an important factor to take into 
consideration when trying to understand the drone attacks in FATA?  
 
Warfare is no longer centered around the notion of state vs. state, but has assumed a transnational 
character (Graham 2009: 389). This is i.a. a consequence of the changed concept of the enemy (see 
chapter 3). 
 
Graham argues that warfare has shifted from a notion of “battlefield” to “battlespace” which implies 
that “everything becomes a site of permanent war. Nothing lies outside battlespace, temporally or 
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geographically” (Ibid.). As well as the vague enemy definition renders everyone a potential enemy, 
the notion of battlespace renders every place a potential site of war, which thus“(...) has lost its 
well-defined contours” (Gregory 2011a: 239, quoting Münkler 2005: 3). From this point of view, 
the entire world has become a potential site of war. 
 
Gregory argues that the concept of a global battlespace can be perceived as a “grey zone” (Gregory 
2011a: 241). By quoting the Human Rights Watch asking President Obama: “Does it view the 
battlefield as global in a literal sense, allowing lethal force to be used, in accordance with the laws 
of war, against a suspected terrorist in an apartment in Paris, a shopping mall in London, or a bus 
station in Iowa City?” (Gregory 2011: 241) he therefore poses the question: where does this 
apparently limitless battlespace end? 
 
When the U.S. speaks of a global battlespace, does that mean that drone strikes could be a part of 
everyday life in the Western world as well? The picture painted by the Human Rights Watch is 
difficult to imagine actually taking place. When trying to understand why it appears difficult to 
imagine such a scenario taking place, one could turn its attention to Graham, who highlights the 
way post-colonial states have been - and still are - perceived. He argues that the War on Terror 
discourse has constructed imaginative geographies, creating a distance between “our” places or 
homeland and “theirs” , which serve to legitimise the attack of the latter (Graham 2006: 256). 
Furthermore he states that this distancing of “us” from “them” is not at all a new tactic; citing 
Gregory, he argues that “In fact, [the imaginative geographies] revivify long-established colonial 
and Orientalist tropes to represent Middle Eastern culture as intrinsically barbaric, infantile, 
backward or threatening from the point of view of Western colonial powers (Gregory 2004 as 
quoted in Graham 2006: 256).  
 
Following this argument, the colonial heritage still divides states in an “us” and “them”. It becomes 
easier to legitimise targeting of these former colonial states because some of them - like Pakistan 
(and other former colonies like Yemen and Somalia which also experience drone strikes) are 
perceived weak and unable to control “threats” within their borders. 
 
Based on these assertions, the answer to Gregory’s question would be that the battlespace ends 
where the Western sphere begins; but Graham takes the argument to a further level. In a globalised 
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world, where presumed enemies easily can cross national borders, the distinction between a safe 
“homeland” and a hostile “other” falls short, because the perceived enemy might as well be found 
within the homeland borders, verifying the notion that “[n]othing lies outside battlespace” (Graham 
2006: 256 & Graham 2009: 389). As a result of national security, national borders have regained 
their importance, but appear in new settings (Graham 2006: 258). We will return to that argument 
later. 
 
While the battlespace then is allegedly limitless, the rhetorical question posed to President Obama 
by Human Rights Watch still remains unanswered; if the battlespace indeed is global, does that 
mean that we can expect to see drones targeting wanted “terrorists” in a shopping mall in Europe? 
According to CIA Director Brennan, the concept of global battlespace is to be taken quite literally: 
“Finally, on your question about whether I would support legislation to authorize the use of force 
outside of “hot” battlefields, I believe we currently have the authority to take action in such 
circumstances against al-Qa’ida and associated forces.” (Brennan 2013: 26). In short, the 
battlespace is determined by the presence of the perceived enemy, and the U.S., in this case the CIA 
which conducts the drone strike-campaign in Pakistan, finds it has the authority to take action 
regardless of where this enemy might be. 
 
FATA and its colonial heritage  
As stated by CIA Director Brennan, drone strikes will be conducted (any)where the enemy is. 
However, this argument has to be regarded in its actual context; drone strikes are conducted in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen and Somalia, states which are perceived weak (Rice & Patrick 2008) 
and thus “ [Pakistan] can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states” 
(National Security Strategy 2002, introduction: 4)  
 
In this view and in accordance with Graham, the notion of everything becoming a potential 
battlespace is easier imagined when the threat erupts from states that are perceived weak; In the 
U.S. National Security Strategy, Pakistan is named “ a safe haven” for Al-Qaeda and other “terrorist 
affiliates” (National Security Strategy 2010: 19), implicitly stating that Pakistan has not been able to 
control this perceived insurgency threat within its borders, and this has compelled the U.S. to act 
(National Security Strategy 2002: 15). 
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Even though “strong” states such as the U.S. consider Pakistan to be “weak”, it is officially a 
sovereign state with the same rights as any other state - yet Pakistan´s weakness is what legitimises 
the U.S. to intervene.  
 
Robert Jackson explains this double-sided approach to weak states´ sovereignty by distinguishing 
between juridical- and empirical statehood; while the ex-colonial states juridically possess the same 
rights as other states, they lack the measures to empower these rights. Robert Jackson uses the 
concept of “quasi-states” to describe them (Jackson 1990: 21). 
According to Jackson, the notion of inequality of sovereign states is not at all new, but the approach 
to these states has changed, as they are “(....) disclosed by a new positive international society 
which fostered the independence of such states and caters for their survival and development” 
(Jackson 1990: 25). “Weak” states are then treated differently than other “strong” sovereign states, 
because their weakness is regarded a reason for the international society to provide “positive 
assistance” (Jackson 1990: 24), in order to ensure their survival. The sovereignty, and thereby the 
existence of quasi-states is not threatened, because the importance of their juridical statehood has 
exceeded the importance of the empirical statehood (Jackson 1990: 23). 
 
In this notion, FATA then exposes a problem for the perceived sovereignty of Pakistan in terms of 
empirical sovereignty; the area is marginalised from the rest of Pakistan due to the administrative 
system, which we have already touched upon, through which FATA is administered semi-
autonomously. The administrative structure allows the Pakistani government to interfere as little as 
possible in tribal matters. The system has given the Pashtuns room to live according to tribal norms, 
and has enabled them to keep a traditional way of life, at least to some extent, throughout history. 
But it can also be argued that the differentiation from the rest of the country has had a negative 
impact on FATA´s development; the FCR is popularly referred to as a “Draconian law” and has 
been widely criticised for depriving the people of FATA of fundamental rights, with clauses that 
e.g. hold an entire clan liable for one member´s actions. Poverty and lack of basic amenities is 
another major problem in FATA, which is another area where the Pakistani government has 
received critique, as development initiatives have not been prioritised in FATA to the same extent 
as the rest of Pakistan. This opinion is even expressed on the official website of FATA: “Since the 
independence of Pakistan, FATA has not been accorded the same priority in terms of the 
development process being undertaken in other parts of the country. The development initiatives 
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and allocations in FATA followed a compartmentalized approach, concentrated around sectoral 
facilities and benefiting few influential and politically active sections. This ad hoc approach 
deprived large segments of the population from social uplift, and economic empowerment” 
(fata.gov.pk 2013). 
 
FATA is one of the poorest regions in Pakistan with 60% of the population estimated to live below 
the poverty line (CAMP 2012: 3).  The socio-economic situation is furthermore affected by scarce 
work opportunities and a high illiteracy; according to the 1998 Pakistan Census, the average literacy 
rate of both sexes is 17.42 %, and the literacy ratio of women is as low as 3%. Considering that the 
average literacy ratio of Pakistan is 43.92%, FATA´s average literacy rate is extremely low in 
comparison. (Population Census Organization 2013). 
 
FATA´s developmental challenges and marginalisation from the rest of Pakistan are often referred 
to as one of the causes of why “terrorist” fractions such as Al-Qaeda and Taliban have been able to 
find a base in the area, deeming FATA to pose a security threat in the eyes of the U.S. 
According to Jackson, the state´s ability to provide security for its citizens is a basic prerequisite of 
sovereignty, and “Where domestic security is not made available by the state it is usually 
understood to be an urgent problem that ought to be corrected. (....) Insecurity is a sign of state 
weakness, lack of will, loss of control, collapse, failure” (Jackson 2007: 298).  Seen from an 
American perspective, the notion of Pakistan as being a “safe haven for terrorists” (Obama 2009) 
poses a security threat, which the Pakistani state has not been able to control. In Jackson's view, 
states which are unable to protect their territories from terrorists “(...) are provoking foreign powers 
to intervene in their territorial jurisdiction or to take other actions to deal with the threat” (Jackson 
2007: 314). 
 
The U.S drone campaign on Pakistani territory is then apparently legitimised by rendering the 
presence of “terrorists” in the borderlands a question of U.S. Homeland security;  and the drone 
campaign continues, even though it could be considered a violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty - as 
the UN officially has stated that it is (Leiby 15-03-2013). 
Given that the enemy concept, where the target  potentially can be found anywhere, the entire 
world, at least in theory, is rendered a “global battlespace” (Gregory 2011b: 190). From this 
notion, the fact that the U.S. drone strikes are conducted on the territory of another sovereign state 
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is somehow subordinate in the context of New Wars. FATA has become a battlespace, because the 
U.S. perceives the area as a terrorist nest, which legitimises targeting of the area. The “terrorists” 
are perceived as threats, and thereby they become a threat - and legitimate targets (Graham 2006) If 
Pakistan is not at war with the U.S, is it then obliged to endure the fact that drone strikes are being 
conducted on Pakistani territory? 
 
As we will discuss in the next section, the notion of battlespace puts a significant strain on the 
sovereign state whose territory is affected. Even though the target  of the U.S. drone strikes is not 
the state itself, but non-state actors such as wanted “terrorists”, the fact still remains that the strikes 
are conducted on another state's territory.   
 
Do drone attacks put sovereignty under attack as well? 
While the volatile concept of the enemy legitimates “New Wars” to be fought without consideration 
of state borders, the new and improved technology (i.e. drones) is what actually makes it possible. 
As described in the technology-chapter above, the carrying out of signature strikes and the almost 
risk free conduction of attacks makes it a convenient - some would say “perfect” type of warfare. 
(Gregory 2011b: 190). The term “surgical” strikes, as stated in chapter 2, gives the impression of a 
“neat and clean” way of targeting the enemy, with such precision that virtually eliminates civilian 
casualties, and without risking the life of the person conducting the drone. As stated by CIA director 
John Brennan “[...] [drones] dramatically reduce the danger to U.S. personnel and to innocent 
civilians, especially considered against massive ordnance that can cause injury and death far 
beyond the intended target.” (Brennan 2013: 26). From this statement we see an argument arising 
that an intelligence war conducted by the use of drones can be perceived as a smaller infringement 
of a state's sovereignty, because there is no need of an actual physical military presence. 
Pakistan though, finds the drone strikes on its territory to be a violation of its sovereignty.  
 
Following an attack in November 2011 where 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by NATO troops the 
relationship between Pakistan and U.S. became further strained (BBC 27-11-2011). 
In April 2012, the Pakistani government issued a statement regarding revised guidelines for the 
relationship with the U.S., where Pakistan explicitly condemns the U.S. drone campaign on its 
territory, stating that “Pakistan's sovereignty shall not be compromised (....)The relationship with 
USA should be based on mutual respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity 
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of each other” (National Assembly of Pakistan 12-4-2012: 1). As a consequence, the Pakistani 
government closed important NATO supply lines to Afghanistan and demanded an American air 
base to be vacated (BBC 27-11-2011). After the official statement from the Pakistani government 
condemning attacks on Pakistani territory - the U.S. once again conducted a drone strike on 
Pakistani soil (Leiby & DeYoung 29-04-2012) - and has not seized to do so since. 
 
The Pakistani government´s closing of NATO supply lines is an example of the geopolitical power 
which Pakistan possesses and why the U.S. regards the state as being an important ally 
(International Security Advisory Board 2012: 3) - but in light of that the drone strikes continued 
even after the official statement condemning them, it is also an example of what seems to be a 
limited U.S. respect for the sovereignty of Pakistan. 
 
From U.S.´ perspective, the presence of what they consider enemies on Pakistani soil makes it part 
of the global battlespace; although the drone strikes occur on Pakistani territory, the strikes are 
therefore considered “legitimate acts of self-defense”, aimed at a legitimate target. As long as the 
U.S. consider Pakistan a “safe haven” to terrorists, the drone strikes become a way of ensuring 
homeland security, and giving the U.S. “the authority to take action” (Brennan 2013: 26). 
The statement from the Pakistani government declares that strikes are considered a violation of its 
sovereignty, but based on both the U.S. National Security Strategy and The (American) Pakistani 
and U.S. Security Strategy, it is quite clear that, in the eyes of the U.S., the Pakistani state fails to 
live up to the classic notion of what constitutes a sovereign state. That is, its ability to provide 
domestic security, rendering it a question of Pakistan being either unwilling or unable to control the 
area of FATA. 
 
We will however argue that the situation cannot be reduced to a question of unwillingness nor 
incapability. The situation in FATA is the “result” of various factors that have to be taken into 
consideration to fully understand the complexity of the area. And the following section will provide 
an overview of the special circumstances of FATA. 
As already mentioned above, FATA is administered very differently than the rest of Pakistan 
through the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which has been the administrative framework of 
the area since Pakistan´s past as a British Colony (Zaidi 2010: 2).  Another inheritance from that 
period is the state border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Durand Line. Like most other post-
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colonial states, the borders of the state have been drawn by its former colonial ruler – in this case 
Great Britain. The Durand line was drawn without taking social or religious factors into 
consideration, separating Pashtun families and tribes, and to this day people living in the area cross 
it without considering the fact that they move from one state to another (Zaidi 2010: 1-4). The goal 
was then to create a “buffer zone” between the two great powers, Russia and Great Britain. (Shaw 
& Akhter 2012: 1497), and we argue that FATA has remained a “buffer zone” between the former 
great powers´ colonies, Afghanistan and Pakistan; an area of international interest throughout 
history due to its strategic location, but never a fully integrated part of Pakistan. 
 
As we have already mentioned, FATA is marginalised from the rest of Pakistan due to the 
administrational system. Considering the above-mentioned circumstances evolving around the 
Durand Line, we believe both factors serve an explanatory purpose as to why FATA is not a fully 
integrated part of Pakistan. Based on the reflections concerning the demarcation, we argue that the 
border does not reflect the “reality”; does FATA constitute a part of Pakistan´s national entity, or 
does Pakistan´s “real” national border in fact end where the area of FATA begins, and is that one of 
the main explanations as to why Pakistan is perceived unable to exercise its sovereign power in the 
region? 
 
Even though it can be argued that some state borders, such as the Durand Line, do not reflect the 
reality of their geography, the concept of “New Wars” highlights a change in the way in which the 
national borders are perceived as well; as we have already mentioned in the beginning of this 
chapter, Graham argues that one consequence of the “New Wars” is that national borders have 
regained their importance in order to protect “homeland” territory from the perceived terrorist 
threats. This effort to securitise the “homelands” has resulted in “the eruption of national border 
points within the territorial limits of nations at airports and fast rail stations” (Graham 2006: 158, 
quoting Andreas 2003: 1). So when Graham states that “borders are back in style” (Ibid.), one can 
wonder when they were out of style? He sees the newly strengthened borders as following “(...) 
decades where the business press and politicians endlessly celebrated the supposed collapse of 
boundaries (at least for mobile capital) through neoliberal globalization (...)” (Ibid.). These 
statements entail an interesting discussion of the discrepancy between the traditional state-borders 
and how globalisation appears to have rendered them less significant; but also how new borders are 
created in the context of “New Wars”, enhanced security and technology. 
Global Studies S2013 
Camilla Marta Giordano, Ida Ørum Groth, Lise Karlshøj Ipsen & Morten Arnfast Jansen 
 48 
These perceptions of the global battlespace blurring borders and at the same time strengthening 
others - newly located ones in e.g. airports and train stations - cast light upon what can be perceived 
as quite a paradox; within the concept of “New Wars”, some national borders are strengthened, 
while others are disregarded in order to target the “enemies”. But as we have argued throughout this 
chapter, and as stated by Graham, in this paradox lies the understanding of the different perceptions 
of “ours” and “their” borders. In the U.S Global War on Terror, sovereign states which are not 
regarded capable of providing security within their own state borders, must apparently accept that 
housing “terrorists” provokes “(...) foreign powers to intervene in their territorial jurisdiction or to 
take other actions to deal with the threat” (Jackson 2007: 314), as it is seen with the U.S. drone 
strikes on Pakistani soil. 
 
In this chapter we have focused on the sovereignty of Pakistan and how it seemingly is being 
violated by the U.S. drone attacks. By using the theories of Graham and Gregory, we have argued 
that the situation In FATA can be explained by the ideas of “New Wars” in the sense that FATA is 
part of  a battlespace in the U.S. War on Terror. We have also looked into the history and structures 
of FATA in order to understand why the region continuously has been target for outside 
intervention. The heritage from its former colonial government still sticks to FATA;. it is 
marginalised from Pakistan to a degree where not even the laws are the same. Seen from a U.S. 
perspective, the Government of Pakistan does not have control over the affairs of FATA - and is 
thus a “legitimate target” in the Global War on Terror.  
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Chapter 5: The blurring of lines between military and civil society. 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters we have shown how the drone strikes-campaign in Pakistan reflect the 
“New Wars” tendencies of dramatically improved technology, a change in the way enemies are 
perceived and the blurring of borderlines and sovereignty. In this section, we will explore the 
tendency that Gregory and Graham describe as a blurring of the line between military and civil 
society (Graham 2011, Gregory 2010 & Gregory 2011a). This will be done by analysing how the 
CIA conducts the drone campaign in Pakistan and which consequences it has when the CIA and not 
the Military are directing the campaign. 
 
The First CIA War 
Drones only constitute a technology - a method with which an actor can obtain his or her goals. 
This technology has, as already described, an integrated kill-strategical inclination. However, the 
actor who commands the drones - who has chosen to utilise drones and determine to what purpose 
they are to be used, is equally as important. The drone strikes in FATA are conducted by the CIA, 
not conventional military, and constitute the first CIA war in history (Gregory 2011: 241). 
 
That drone strikes constitute a “CIA War”, means that it is an independent military operation 
commanded and conducted by the CIA with involvement from the U.S. Air Force (Gregory 2011a: 
241 & Singer 2010). A “CIA War” entails that it is the CIA who is handling the entire operation; 
the weapons, the issues of operational concept and strategy, rules of engagement, the juridical rules 
and procedures etc. In other words, the entire kill-chain including its administrative aspects. The 
CIA is conducting an independent military operation - or more simply a “war”. This also means that 
the personnel handling these war-related issues does not have the professional background nor 
official mandate to be handling such issues as they are civilians - not military personnel (Singer 
2010). 
 
The CIA is an Intelligence Agency, created to gather Intelligence in order to uphold the U.S. 
national security. According to Gregory “[t]he CIA was created in 1947 as a civilian agency to 
counterbalance the influence of the military.” (Gregory 2011: 241) and it is, unlike U.S. Military 
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Intelligence Corps, a civilian state-organisation and thus does not carry the legal mandate for 
conducting war or military operations without special authorisation. Yet, shortly after 9/11 
President George W. Bush signed “kill, capture or detain”-orders for the CIA in their battle against 
the Al-Qaeda, practically authorising its conductance of independent military operations. Despite all 
of this “the United States is not at war with Pakistan” (Gregory 2011a: 241) because the conflict is 
not aligned with the classical definition of war as state-on-state battle, nor is an official declaration 
of war signed and the White House and the Pakistani state denies that they are at war (Gregory 
2011: 241). 
 
This development in what and who conducts military operations is closely aligned with how 
Gregory describes that “a line between the CIA and the military is deliberately blurred” (Gregory 
2010: 241), or in other words, the blurring of the borders between what constitutes actions of civil 
and military society is not just happening, it is premeditated. Suddenly, there is a question of who is 
authorised to conduct war- a question with no simple answers. 
We are not sure whether we would go as far to say that the blurring is “deliberate”, but we will 
argue that it is a consequence of a changed paradigm in warfare. A notion which is described by 
Gregory as “Virtuous War” (Gregory 2011b, quoting Der Derian 2009: 188), a concept which in 
Gregory’s theoretical argument has gained increased dominance in “New Wars” as the normative 
foundation of the same.  
 
In the next section we will examine the notion of a “Virtuous War”. Can the use of drones help 
creating a less brutal war? Or are the two words of “virtuous” and “war” just too opposite?  
 
The paradigm underpinning CIA drone strikes 
“Virtuous War” is based on the narrative that war is a brutal affair in which human casualties are 
part of the collateral damage constituting war. However, the “Virtuous War”-argument is a norm 
implying that it can be led with low levels of civilian casualties and minimal loss of soldiers, that is, 
a more civilised way of conducting war.  
 
That achieving military victory can be done with minimal human and economic losses is not a new 
concept, but can be traced back through the theories of war since ancient writers like that of military 
theorist and General Sun Tzu (Tzu 2012). Yet the concept has gained new support through the 
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development in technological weapons, the so-called “Revolution in Military Affairs” (RMA) 
which has - according to Gregory’s argument, made “Virtuous War” a possibility (Gregory 2010B: 
189). RMA is based upon the notion that the evolution of smart weapons, communication and 
information technologies has resulted in a revolution in military affairs in which high-precision 
surgical strikes have become favored over the use of conventional weapons, or as Gregory puts it: 
“The emphasis [of RMA] would be on pre-emptive strikes using a combination of new, non-nuclear 
precision weapon systems and information technology to reduce collateral damage and achieve a 
decisive military advantage. “ (Gregory 2010: 160). 
 
With the revolution in military affairs, the principles of “Virtuous War” are based upon the notion 
that advanced militaries, through their superior technology, better training, more advanced tactics 
and “higher morale” have the possibility and responsibility to achieve victory in war in the fastest 
time possible and with a minimum of civilian casualties and so-called “collateral damage”. This 
brings us to the perception of “our wars”, that is that “our wars” - Western wars, are “wars 
conducted by advanced militaries that are supposed to be surgical, sensitive and scrupulous” 
(Gregory 2011: 239) as opposed to the perception of “their wars”; wars conducted by agents of 
brutality and greed living in “wild zones” which are near-breakdown, and thus creates merciless 
wars (Ibid.). It is in this spectrum that virtuous wars are to be perceived as a measurement of how 
“our wars” differs from “their wars” 
When “our wars” are perceived as distinctly sensitive and surgical, it becomes important that the 
conductor of war reflects these ideas. When war is defined by high-tech“military applications of 
control, surveillance, communications, simulation and targeting technologies.” (Graham 2011: 
141), which seek to systematise war into geometric squares targeted on a screen, we are nearing 
what we argue is a culture of identifying, locating and targeting as a vital part of warfare.  
This is evident in what we have previously discussed about “signature strikes” - strikes which target 
those who, given certain preceding parameters, are likely to be “terrorists”. 
 
This logic is described by Gregory as the act of locating which “entails not only an abstraction of 
the target, however, but also an abstraction of the process through which the target is produced, 
which is rendered as a purely technical division of labour whose outcome is logical and rational: 
target as telos.” (Gregory 2010: 174). The target is the means of the military operation; the target is 
located by technological measures of surveillance, stripped of normative deliberation, and thus 
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becomes an abstract objective, targeted by the logic underlying the entire paradigm of “virtuous 
war” and RMA. Thus, it is our argument that what becomes the focus of any military operation 
residing under this paradigm is the threefold strategy of identifying the target(s), locating the 
target(s) and, endingly, targeting the target(s): All which become a purely technological act, 
designed with the purpose of decreasing soldier loss and civilian casualties while increasing the rate 
of military success. This is seen by Graham as a reflection of a technophilia shaping the U.S. 
Military Systems; the society, as well as in general. In this view, the technology becomes the 
primary motor of the conductance of military operations (Graham 2006: 269). 
Through these lenses, we will argue that it makes sense to use the improved technology to remove 
the “brutality” from conducting war in the way that the Military is perceived to handle war - that is 
with high levels of “collateral damage” consistent with the notion of “their wars”. Instead, war 
could be conducted by the “soft” agents of intelligence with the capacity to carefully select their 
targets and live up to the norms of “our wars” as consistent with the paradigm of “Virtuous War”. 
 
The shift from military conductance of war to a war of intelligence using “surgical” strikes is the 
notion behind the idea of “Virtuous War”. This shift from military to intelligence operations and 
what it entails will be described in the following chapter. 
 
Shift in operational command 
We argue that the drone campaign in Pakistan constitutes a change in the procedure of warfare 
especially concerning the complex relationship between intelligence and military action. Previously, 
the balance between the Intelligence and the Military was based upon the chain-of-command 
emphasising the Intelligence as providers of knowledge and the Military as commanders, 
practitioners of the tools and, consequently, the executive agent. This allocation of assignments was 
based upon the notion that application of the military tools constituted the biggest risk-factor 
regarding the potential success of a mission. Thus it made sense to have the Military acting as the 
executive agent due to its wider operational experience in the field. However, with the invention of 
smart weapons, such as drones, which enables the shooter to hit what he is aiming at with almost a 
hundred percent accuracy.  
 
We will argue that the development in high-precision military hardware has deemed conventional 
practical and operational military expertise less important in military operations compared to 
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intelligence gathering about the targets, including operational identifying and locating. The central 
variable in the success of a mission has become the successful application of the right measures of 
Intelligence-gathering in the process of identifying the targets, rather than the using of paramount 
soldiers and strategy. In other terms: with the invention of smart weapons the question of “if” the 
target is hit, is no longer an important variable because the equipment hit what it is aiming for, so 
the key question is now rather who we hit and whether this target was legitimate. 
 
Following this technological advancement and change in what constitutes a successful operation, 
we see the transference of the role as executive agent and the general command of the military 
operation(s) to the CIA as logical. When the command is shift from the Military to the Intelligence 
it reflects that they have the expertise in the area which now constitutes the prime variable in the 
success of a mission. 
Because of the transference of military capabilities from the Military to a civil intelligence agency, 
the drone-campaign in Pakistan constitutes a new situation in which a civil agency conducts a 
military operation on another state’s territory.  
 
Normally, military conducting operations on another state’s territory would constitute an unlawful 
execution of power and thus a violation of that state's sovereignty.  However, it does not constitute a 
violation of sovereignty if the state has consented, or if it is an act of self-defense and the state in 
question is either unwilling or unable to take the appropriate steps (Living Under Drones 2012: 105-
107). However, in the case of the U.S drone campaign in Pakistan, it is still contested whether the 
U.S. is violating Pakistan's sovereignty; as we have already mentioned in chapter 4, Pakistan has 
stated that it does not consent to the drone-strikes, and that they regard U.S.´actions as a breach of 
Pakistan's sovereignty. The U.S. on the other hand, considers the drone strikes as a lawful act of 
self-defense, and thus does not regard it a breach of sovereignty (Obama 2013). We have very early 
in this project decided not to dwell on the juridical aspects of the drone strikes, as this legal aspect 
of the drone-campaign, although very interesting, could easily constitute an entire project in itself. 
Although we do not intend to examine the legal aspects, we have chosen to highlight certain 
implications of CIA´s role in the drone campaign that are legal in nature, because they serve to 
emphasise our argument that the drone campaign is as a “war without a war”; a war undermining 
the fundamentals of the very concept of war. 
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The “new” war? 
What do we mean by “war without a war”? Firstly, in very real terms FATA’s population’s inability 
to fight back against the opponent creates asymmetry. Even though they can damage the drones, 
that is, cause loss of equipment and economical grievances on the opposing sides, they cannot 
create human damage and through this defeat their opponent. The idea that two sides oppose each 
other constitutes one of the fundamentals of war and without it, you could argue that claiming the 
very concept of war is being undermined. The drone strikes become an extreme form of 
asymmetrical warfare which one side is completely stripped of the possibility of real participation in 
the so-called “war”, and compared to the conventional definition of war; this “war” is not 
articulated nor acknowledged as a war between the U.S. and Pakistan by either party. Instead, the 
drone strikes constitute part of the U.S. operation against global terrorism in the region. 
Furthermore, as long as it is conducted by Intelligence rather than an official actor of war, it is not a 
war - even though people are killed as a result of methods generally associated with war. Lastly, the 
two most recognised databases of armed conflicts globally, the correlates of war (COW) and the 
PRIO armed conflict database, do not report of any war between the U.S. and Pakistan, further 
emphasising that no war is happening between the two parties. However, both report of a number of 
internal conflicts in Pakistan (COW 2007 & PRIO 2009). 
 
The fact that it is the CIA which constitutes the executing agent of the drone campaign has a wide 
array of complex political consequences both for the victims as well as for the “perpetrators” - the 
CIA as conductor of the “non-war”. As the CIA does not constitute a part of the Military branch of 
the U.S. government, but is part of the civil society (Gregory 2011a: 241) its commandment of a 
military operation constitutes a juridical problem -when conducted by the CIA, the drone-campaign 
becomes a legal grey-zone because the CIA does not have the legal authority to conduct military 
operations (Gregory 2011: 241).  
 
A general critique of the drone strikes, leading from a normative juridical perspective, is that of 
accountability (Living Under Drones 2012: 123); it is generally acknowledged that in war the 
question of accountability and responsibility is a complex question at best. In conjunction with the 
secretive nature of Intelligence in general as well as with the CIA, a question of accountability 
occurs. It is difficult for the public to access information regarding both the conduction of and the 
Global Studies S2013 
Camilla Marta Giordano, Ida Ørum Groth, Lise Karlshøj Ipsen & Morten Arnfast Jansen 
 55 
decisions behind the drone strikes. Or as Gregory’s puts it: "Accountability is limited enough in the 
case of a declared war; in an undeclared war it all but disappears." (Gregory 2011a: 241). Due to 
this lack in accountability, the question of responsibility is becoming equally blurred. Not knowing 
who has responsibility has had a profound effect on the civilian population victimised by the drone 
strikes as neither the U.S. nor the Pakistani government have taken responsibility for the strikes, and 
therefore no economic deprivation has been paid to the civilians victimised in the area (Rogers 
2010: 63). Surviving relatives are not victims of an actual war - but if not war - then what? This 
question will be examined in the following section. 
If not war - then what? 
We will argue that the drone strikes, as they are conducted by Intelligence, rather than the Military, 
are not acts of war per se, but rather a foreign policy instrument, a tool with which to handle 
problems occurring outside the national boundaries of the U.S. itself. 
This is possible as an aspect of the culture of “identifying, locating, targeting”, as we have touched 
upon prior in this chapter. This culture, which is technophilia in essence (Graham 2006: 269), 
makes the targeting of victims a question of gathering the correct intelligence in order to target the 
“right” targets; the act of killing “terrorists” becomes a rational, apolitical act (Ibid.). When pulling 
the trigger, the operator merely does what is most rational in the given situation - striking the 
located enemy. And as the enemy, as seen in chapter 3, is defined in terms of black and white; 
terrorist and non-terrorist. There is no perceived in-between when pulling the trigger, no grey-zone 
in which it becomes doubtful whether the intended target is in fact guilty. Through this paradigm, 
the act of a drone strike therefore becomes a logical act, removing any emotional aspect of drone-
strikes for the operator (Hastings 2012: 5). 
 
When politics is stripped off warfare, it leaves war as an apolitical rational “tool”, a means to an 
end; a cause to an effect. We argue that the drones, as part of the RMA become a surgical-precision 
tool (Gregory 2011). Implying that they with surgical precision remove the “infected tissue”; they 
perform a needed operation for solving a health-problem. Shifting this metaphor to the case of 
FATA, the region becomes the infected tissue, a symptom of a global (health-)problem which needs 
to be fixed - this rationalisation of war is also evident in counterinsurgency-strategy, as touched 
upon in chapter 2, which also uses “instrumental rationalism” and thus sees itself as a problem-
solving activity, solving the global problem of “terrorism” (Jones, Smith & Stone 2012: 610). But 
because no declaration of war has been made - and no admittance by the White House that a war is 
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happening, the “problem-fixing” drone strikes constitute more a foreign policy tool. A political 
instrument which, somehow, is not war, but is violence utilised in order to achieve wanted goals 
across the globe. You could call it “not-so-diplomatic” diplomacy. Or explaining it through the 
health-metaphor as evident in the paradigm of RMA, the “surgical strikes” of drones becomes some 
form of foreign aid which seeks at “stabilising” the FATA-region by striking down on the “virus” 
infecting it. 
 
Through this logic, a CIA conducted drone-campaign could happen anywhere on the globe where 
the U.S. sees a “health risk”, following very much with Gregory’s logic that the U.S. way of 
conducting war is an “everywhere war” (Gregory 2011a). However we will argue that since war-
like actions are utilised without the conduction of war, “war” might as well be happening nowhere 
and everywhere at the same time. We see a tendency, in that the drone strikes are conducted, as a 
war is actually happening nowhere even though people are killed at the hands of military hardware. 
And, as the "war" is being removed from "warfare" it, in Graham’s terms, becomes a fundament for 
life itself, a construction which permeates every layer of society as the focus of society. This is a 
very central argument of Graham (2011), which resonates in the light of the justification 
underpinning the drone strikes. Somehow the act of killing has become a foreign policy tool with 
the quiet acceptance of the drone strikes in Pakistan. We will argue that the drone strikes for the 
U.S. have become a sort of preemptive strategy of foreign politics, aligning with Gregory’s notion 
of RMA’s “[...] emphasis [...] on pre-emptive strikes using a combination of new, non-nuclear 
precision weapon systems and information technology [...]“, (Gregory 2010:160 – see above for full 
quote). 
 
Because the CIA uses military methods in conducting foreign policy, or in other words has made 
the act of killing an instrument of foreign policy, we will in the following argue that they have 
become reminiscent to what they are seeking to fight - that is “terrorists”. 
 
CIA as “unlawful combatants” 
A problem arises when civilians operate weapon systems and are commanding kill-chains, despite 
the question of juridical mandate, as mentioned above. When the CIA operates drones as part of a 
killing operation in FATA, it is not a legal conductor of war. Instead CIA is what Gregory calls 
“unlawful combatants” (Gregory 2011: 241), just as any other actor of transnational militancy, 
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which is not the Military, would be. Conclusively, we argue that when the CIA is conducting 
military operations, they are just as illegitimate violent actors of a political purpose as the 
transnational militants they are trying to fight - an argument which will be explained below. 
 
The primary features of so-called “terrorists” are their ability to blend in with society and thereby 
being able to conduct attacks anywhere within this society, as elaborated in chapter 3. This ability to 
conduct attacks everywhere results in a general fear in the public as it faces an enemy which is 
perceived as invisible. The method of highly destructive, apparent random attacks conducted by an 
“invisible enemy” used by “terrorists” is also evident in the methodology of drone-strikes, (Living 
Under Drones 2012: 80-81). They too blend in with the everyday life in FATA and cause civilian 
casualties. 
 
Furthermore, both transnational terrorism and the drone-strikes in Pakistan share similarities in 
transnationality in the sense that both are operating without the constraints of national borders and 
that the geographical distance between planning and executing operations is no hindrance. The 
drones operating in Pakistan, like terrorism, also operate within the civil sphere of society. This is 
evident in their presence in the FATA-region which is not officially considered a war-zone.  
 
Furthermore, we argue that drones are, although mostly thought of as being highly visible as huge 
physical machineries of war, essentially invisible in nature. This argument is based upon empirical 
interviews of Rogers with civilians living in the FATA region who constantly fear the drones over 
their heads (Rogers 2010: 59), which describes how drones are an almost permanent sight in the sky 
above the FATA region. The permanent presence, we argue, in itself constitutes an invisible aspect 
because the drone as an object is part of the everyday life of the public. The drone-attacks can 
therefore be argued as being invisible, in that it is not to predict when an attack will happen from 
this ever-present object - this, we argue, supported by the interviews conducted by Rogers, creates a 
general fear in the population which in many ways are similar to the the fear of “terrorism” in the 
US and other western countries.  
 
Furthermore, because of the change in enemy definition as touched upon in chapter 3 as well as the 
increasing dominance of signature strikes as mentioned in chapter 2,  we argue that the drone-
strikes are, like terrorist attacks, perceived as random attacks by the population which occur without 
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warning and with civilian casualties. This perceived randomness of the strikes as well as the ability 
to hit everywhere, have resulted in a level of constant fear in FATA’s population, deriving from an 
unidentifiable source (Rogers 2010: 62). We will argue that this constant fear very much aligns with 
the constant fear produced by transnational militants - so-called “terrorists”, within cities who are 
perceived as potential targets. 
 
To sum up, we argue that drones share many similarities with terrorist attacks, in that they the 
strikes are perceived by the population of FATA as being, random attacks from an “invisible” 
source, by an unlawful combatant, with civilian casualties. The strikes result in a general fear in the 
population as nowhere is perceived as being safe. 
 
Intelligence in warfare 
Gregory’s fundamental notion of the conductor of war is that “a line between the CIA and the 
military [which] is deliberately blurred” (Gregory 2011a: 241) through the concept of “New 
Wars”. However, we will argue that the drone strikes in Pakistan, are not so much blurring as they 
are elucidating the role of Intelligence in military operations, besides the shift in military command 
from the Military to the Intelligence which we have already highlighted earlier in this chapter. As 
formerly mentioned, the drone-campaign constitutes a collaboration between the CIA and the U.S. 
Air Force. Moreover, the military operation is a continuation of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, as it seeks to target the same militants as those seen as a threat towards Afghan 
stability (Gregory 2010a: 242), and the U.S. economically supports the Pakistani troops employed 
in the Northwestern region, including FATA (Fair et.al. 2010: 157ff).  
 
However, even though the drone-campaign in FATA is part of a bigger regional picture of military 
operations, it is evidently clear that it is an independent operation commanded and conducted by the 
CIA. One can hardly call this a “deliberate blur”. Rather it is an elucidation of the importance of 
Intelligence in military operations. An importance which is made clear through the strategic 
employment of “identifying, locating, targeting” which emphasise the importance of Intelligence in 
the successful conduction of operations, as it is the body which is able to produce these particular 
sorts of strategical outputs. 
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In summary we will argue that the notion pressed by Gregory and Graham concerning the blurring 
of lines between civil and military society does have some resonance in the CIA drone campaign in 
Pakistan. This is based upon the fact that the CIA as a civil intelligence agency is conducting what 
many views as a military campaign using military weapons. Furthermore we have argued that the 
drone strikes share similarities with terrorism in methods and consequences for the population 
targeted such as the civilian population in FATA. The drone strikes reveal a shift in the conductance 
of war from the Military to the Intelligence, much aligning with the paradigm of “surgical-
precision” warfare as evident in the “Virtuous War” argument. Through this paradigm, war 
becomes a rational tool to deal with conflicts, rather than a political act. This is furthermore 
highlighted by how the drone strikes, through their conductance by the CIA, becomes a tool of 
foreign policy using methods of war, instead of actual war. However, the fact remains that even 
though the usage of drones as part of the “virtuous war” paradigm, is striving towards clean and 
surgical wars, the civilian casualties in FATA tells a different story. 
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Chapter 6: Discussion 
Here we will discuss how the concept of “New Wars”, as evident in the drone strikes in FATA, 
Pakistan, is an example of something evidently “new”. Both Graham and Gregory are scholars of 
“New Wars” and will therefore be inclined to assume that there is - something - new about “New 
Wars” - and since they are both using drone strikes as an empirical example, these are viewed as 
somewhat new also. However, this chapter is as much questioning the core assumptions of Graham 
and Gregory as it is questioning our core assumptions that the situation constituted of the 
conductance of drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan is evidently new. Our view of this as something 
“new” is shaped by other social actors describing the drone-campaign in Pakistan. We will not 
dwell on the views of these social actors, but challenge our own core assumption that this situation 
constitutes something new. We believe this discussion can provide us with tools to critically 
evaluate our findings. In discussing whether this is new, we are also dampening the “hype” which 
often appears when a situation is framed as evidently “new” in nature; In other words, a situation 
does not just occur out of a historical vacuum, and we will critically approach the perception of 
“newness” in “new wars” as evident in the drone-campaign in FATA, Pakistan. 
 
Both Graham and Gregory talk about the evolution of  technology and both use the example of  the 
development of drones as an important part of what constitutes the newness in “New Wars”. 
Graham calls this a technophilia of society (Graham 2009:385)  We do concur with this notion in 
the sense that the newness of drones as tools of information and as lethal weapons cannot be 
contested. However, we also argue that although drones per se might constitute a new technology, 
they have in many ways been used as a new method of “old” war-strategies. On this basis, the 
question of whether new wars really are new, can be argued.  
 
We argue that even though the use of drones has led to a revolution in the ways air-to-ground 
combat is waged, they are still used as new tools of warfare based upon old strategies of war. A 
good example of this is the kill/capture-strategy, since the drone strikes are conducted through an 
“old” military strategy. We will argue that since the drone strikes constitute a new way of 
conducting the old military strategy of kill/capture, the newness of drones should be contested. It is 
a new method of an old strategy, and consequently the notion of drones as evidence of “New Wars” 
becomes flawed. On the other hand, it could be that the words of P.W.Singer apply: 
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“the British and the French invented the tank, the Germans figured out how to use it.” 
(Singer 2009: 06:25). 
 
If we apply this statement to the case of drones, it could be that drones constitute a new technology 
to which the optimal strategy has yet to be developed. They are a military hardware to which the 
groundbreaking software is yet to be developed. However, when it is developed, it is possible that 
the drones could, just as the tanks, alter the way war is waged. 
 
Another issue contemplating the complex nature of drones is the compression of space and time. As 
the drone commander can control the drone from halfway around the globe gathering real-time 
information, thus causes a compression in that space (as great distance) seemingly ceases to matter, 
because space can be covered in far less time. Graham and Gregory point to this space-time 
compression several times as a key indicator of what they contemplate as “New Wars” (Graham 
2006: 262). We concur with the argument that this development brings about several new 
considerations regarding how war is waged. One the other hand, this space-time compression can 
also be seen as a “logical” development in military technology which has been going on since the 
invention of the bow and arrow. We argue that the drones enable an increased distance between 
combatants thereby allowing the pilots to kill the enemy from further distance, while lowering the 
risk which the pilot is exposed to; This is a development seen before, as it is just another step in the 
“development in increasing distance” as the invention of the canon as well as aerial bombers. We 
do recognise the quantum leap that drones have caused in the issue of distance between combatants, 
however we also perceive the issue of increasing what distance can be overcome during war as an 
old military tendency, and the question whether drones constitute a new type of warfare should 
therefore still be considered complex. 
 
As established in the analysis, Graham describes how asymmetrical warfare is an important aspect 
of what defines the concept of “New Wars”. He further points to the drone strikes in Pakistan as 
evidence of this idea, stating that: 
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“This new ‘generation’ of war is based, they argue, on ‘unconventional’ wars, ‘asymmetric’ 
struggles, ‘global insurgencies’ and ‘low intensity conflicts’, which pit high-tech state militaries 
against informal fighters or mobilized civilians” (Graham 2011: 138) 
 
In relation to this, we argue that asymmetrical warfare is not “new” but a common aspect when 
advanced militaries are fighting less advanced combatants. Following this argument, wars like the 
Vietnam War also constitute an asymmetrical war, because the U.S. possessed much more advanced 
technology than the Northern Vietnamese. Furthermore, the notion that drones in themselves are 
evidence of asymmetrical warfare can also be contested, because were the drones not available, the 
U.S. would arguably still use superior advanced smart weapons like cruise missile of fighter 
airplanes like the F-22 raptor. Following this logic, drones would therefore not be perceived as a 
tendency of “new wars” but rather the most optimal candidate for the job. 
 
We will argue that claiming that wars are fundamentally changing nature often occurs when an 
immense development in technology is being introduced into warfare. Consequently, when the tank, 
the airplane, nuclear weapons or cruise missiles were implemented, they were also seen to 
fundamentally alter or revolutionise the way war was going to be fought or the institution of war 
itself (Liaropoulos 2006 & Nicholls 2000:1 & Lawrence 08-09-1945). However, it took almost two 
decades from the development of the tank until it actually changed how war is conducted with the 
so-called Blitzkrieg, and even though the technique of airplanes and radio was available to all the 
great powers prior to the Second World War, the Germans were the ones who optimised its use in 
warfare, radically changing the conduction of war (Liaropoulos 2006:369-370). In this light, it 
becomes hard to predict whether drones are going to be constituting a “revolution in military 
warfare” without giving drones the adequate time to be truly implemented as a military hardware. 
 
Both Graham and Gregory argue that the concept of what constitutes the enemy has changed within 
“New Wars”; as opposed to conventional wars, wars are no longer mainly inter-state conflicts but 
are increasingly fought between a mix of states and non-state actors. They criticise the vagueness of 
the enemy definition in the Global war on terror, because when the enemy is no longer identifiable 
by uniforms but constitute a part of civil society, it is next to impossible to distinguish the enemy 
from civilians (Graham 2011:139). In our analysis we have argued that the concept of the enemy in 
the Global War on Terror aligns with the concept found in “New Wars”. Thus enemies are no 
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longer defined primarily by state borders but by ideas and beliefs; both the actors’ own ideas and 
beliefs, but also those which they are perceived to have. 
 
However, we will argue that the notion that enemies are no longer defined by “state uniforms and 
flags” but by ideas and belief is not entirely new. 
The belief-based enemy definition, although it does not overlap, share many similarities with the 
enemy definition in for example the Second World War and, as we will dwell on here, the Cold 
War. In the Cold War the U.S. and the West perceived Communism much like they perceive 
Terrorism today. Communism constituted a perceived global enemy which had to be fought 
everywhere including in the U.S. homeland. In this regard, the many new legal initiatives such as 
the increased authority given to state actors through the Patriot Act in the post 9/11 period, share 
similarities with the ideas persisting in the 1950’s under the so-called “Red scare” (USHistory.org 
2013). Terrorism, much like the threat of Communism during the Cold War, is perceived by the 
U.S. as an ever-present global enemy. Terrorism or Communism thus constitute an idea or a set of 
beliefs which are the antithesis to how the U.S. perceives itself. 
 
Graham argues that the discourse legitimising the Global War on Terror is based on a notion of 
imaginative geographies, which distances “Them” from “Us” through a process of “Othering” 
(Graham 2006). Following this argument, the notion of a “new” enemy definition can be seen as 
logical follow-up of the U.S. narrative of “us” and “them”. The narrative describes the “us” i.e. the 
U.S., as a freedom loving state which fights honorably and fairly (i.e. in uniform). Where “they” are 
a shadowy group fighting with inhonorable methods hiding within innocent civilians, waiting to do 
“us” harm: 
 
“On one side are those who believe in the values of freedom and moderation, the right of all people 
to speak and worship and live in liberty. And on the other side are those driven by the values of 
tyranny and extremism, the right of a self-appointed few to impose their fanatical views on all the 
rest. As veterans, you have seen this kind of enemy before. They're successors to fascists, to Nazis, 
to communists and other totalitarians of the 20th century, and history shows what the outcome will 
be. This war will be difficult, this war will be long, and this war will end in the defeat of the 
terrorists of -- totalitarians, and a victory for the cause of freedom and liberty.” (Bush 2006). 
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As Former President George.W. Bush clearly states above, there is not much new to the notion that 
ideas and beliefs are defining feature for the enemy. In this view, whether fascist, nazi, communist 
or terrorist, the enemy is perceived to be driven by values that are not consistent with those of 
freedom and moderation. From this point of view, it is not the targeted state that is the primary 
focus, but the ideas which define the enemy. 
 
However we also hold in mind that states do play an important role when it has to define its enemy. 
The construction of an “us” and them” comes from somewhere, it, as the general tendencies of 
warfare, does not just pop out of nowhere. We will argue that the (inherently vague) concept of the 
enemy which is evident in the drone-campaign in FATA - and the Global War on Terror in general, 
can be seen as a product of the American Security-Regime. We are not saying that they single-
handedly and deliberately “produced” this concept of the enemy, but we are saying that states 
matter because within states lies a power to define what constitutes the “right” and the “wrong” 
ideas - who are to be considered allied and who are to be fought. 
 
The notion that states are no longer an important part of what constitutes an enemy does have some 
credit in the sense that state-on-state wars have diminished in quantity since the end of the Cold 
War. Furthermore, with the increase in civil wars contra state-on-state wars (COW 2007 & Cramer 
2006: 55), the way enemies are perceived has seen a (logical) shift towards groups of non-state 
actors. As more wars are being fought between and against non-state actors, the concept of the 
enemy must obviously change to align with this development. 
 
However,  we perceive the notion that states have become obsolete in what constitutes the enemy 
definition as ignoring two important aspects. Firstly, the term “Rogue States” which was coined by 
the Clinton administration in 1994 (New American Nation 2013) constitutes a counterargument to 
this notion. The perception of “rogue states” implies that states can be aligned with non-state actors 
and that they, at least in the eyes of  the U.S., share the same “hatred” towards the U.S., which 
according to the National Security Strategy, is what makes an actor a threat towards the U.S. 
Security (National Security Strategy 2002:14). However, the term “rogue states” is not used 
 actively in the U.S. Security strategy anymore. It has instead been replaced by the term “weak 
states”. “Weak states”, even though they are perceived as a victim of violence as opposed to “rogue 
states” which are perceived conductors of violence, are still marking that when it comes to defining 
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who constitutes the enemy, states matter. Some states are simply more “at risk” from the enemy 
than other. In this perception, terrorism in the West does not pose such a high risk globally as 
terrorism in the “weak states”. 
 
One of the core theoretical notions  of what Graham and Gregory identify as “New Wars”, is the 
idea that war is moving from a “battlefield to a battlespace”. “War has lost its well-defined 
contours” and is increasingly happening anywhere the enemy might be hiding, transgressing every 
layer of society. This causes war to be “everywhere” in the so-called “global battlespace” as part of 
the concept “New Wars” (Graham 2009 & Gregory 2011a). However, we will contest that 
“battlefield” is a meaningful analytical entity to understand any war with, thereby saying that the 
so-called “move” is instead a cognition of the many complex layers within the constitution of war 
itself.  
 
The notion of battlespace entails that the battlefield is exceedingly happening everywhere, raising 
questions about “where the battlefield begins and where it ends’ geographically, and thus that 
“everything becomes a site of permanent war” (Graham 2009: 389 & Gregory 2011a). It would be 
hard empirically to defy a notion that war could erupt anywhere as this is a circular argument; there 
is no way to truly “test” this notion, other than the plain fact that war, as in armed conflict,  is not 
happening everywhere, but states globally still prepare for war.  
 
Battlespace entails the notion that the entire society is now a part of war since war perpetually 
targets entire cities (Graham 2009: 393). However, war has always entailed entire countries, 
regions, which were seen as perpetual targets. The Cold War was an equal example of a war where 
entire cities of either “the west” or “the east” were seen as threats of a dangerous ideology (Den 
Store Danske 2013). Moreover, Graham’s notion of “New Wars” which “permanently treat all 
urban residents as perpetual targets“ (Graham 2009:393) could arguably apply to the current 
situation in  FATA as well as the Second World War bombings of civilian compounds in midtown 
Berlin (History.co.uk 2013). Graham has a point in that war does not just perceive the soldiers 
fighting on the battlefield, but the entire population as enemies and thus targets. Yet, when the U.S. 
conducts drone strikes in FATA as one distinct area of “hostility” -  including its civilians, it does 
not differ from previous types of warfare; perhaps only in that even though the U.S. is killing 
Pakistani citizens, they are not conducting war on the Pakistani state. 
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Retreating to the empirical example of the Cold War, “the East” and “the West” entails many 
parallels to the notion of a “battlespace of permanent war”. The Cold War-era was a period of over 
40 years where two military alliances were in a situation of “permanent war” - or more correctly a 
situation of immense politico-military tension between the world’s two great powers. In this period, 
sovereign borders within the East and West-block were dim, however, the border between the East 
and the West; the imagined line parting Europe in two, was amplified as a line parting two worlds 
(Den Store Danske 2013), two imaginative geographies (Graham 2006: 256). This battlespace did 
even spread into geographical locations distant from the “East”-”West” division. The Cold war 
brought with it, many so-called “proxy wars” in distant parts of the world (alphahistory 2013). The 
training of some of the local terrorist-movements in Pakistan did start as a something very 
reminiscent to a proxy war between U.S. supported Pakistani militants and Soviet supported 
Afghans (Gardezi 2010). With this example in mind it seems odd claiming that any defined 
contours of war has ever been evident. In fact, the area of FATA has not just been a part of a former 
“proxy war” between the Soviet and the U.S., it has also been regarded by both the Pakistani state 
as well as the English colonial-rule as a “place for war” - a terrain which should be ready for 
entering of armed soldiers in the case of potential war (Akhtar & Shaw 2012: 1499). And so, the 
place has always been surrounded by an aura of war, since it has been used as a potential battlefield 
throughout history, explicitly evident in the FCR and Pakistani constitution which claims the area 
more or less constitute a place of juridical exception; a buffer-zone (Akhtar & Shaw 2012), or, in 
Gregory’s term, “a site of permanent war” (Gregory 2011a: 239). But when we can clearly identify 
that FATA is a site of war, while the rest of Pakistan, even though terrorists are rumoured to be 
residing in the Pakistani area of Baluchistan, another borderland in the Northwestern Province, are 
not subject to the U.S:’ drone strikes (Akhtar & Shaw 2012: 1499), there might not be that much in 
the notion that everywhere is a site of permanent war. 
 
But what is Graham and Gregory’s notion of “battlefield”? What are we really moving from? In 
their view, battlefield is war with defined contours of two uniformed armies of combatants facing 
each other in a geographically defined place and time. However, has this war ever actually taken 
place? It is our argument that the machinery of war has for at least a tremendous time entailed the 
mobilisation of the entire society (Holsti 2004). Recruiting, propagandising, training and producing 
entails the mobilisation of an entire society, not just its military branch . The old nation-state wars 
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were just as much wars between populations than between armies. So eventually, what Graham and 
Gregory are saying about moving “from battlefield to battlespace” is to say that we are moving 
towards a type of war which has been evident for a longer period, and thus can hardly be qualified 
as something “new”, but perhaps the increase in surveillance-technology has made it more evident 
that when a country is at war it is, in fact, the entire society of a country which is at war, not just the 
soldiers on the battlefield. 
 
Gregory’s notion of a “permanent war” furthermore entails a perception of a U.S. which is in 
permanent war. However, even though the U.S. has been at war ever since the invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, the past 12 years can hardly be qualified as “permanent”, even though it might 
seem indefinite now. On the other hand, looking back in history, other great military powers have 
been at war for an overwhelming part of their “reigning”. In Empirical times Great Britain was 
persistently at war in far-off colonies or soon-to-be colonies, or with other states in Europe 
(Marshall 2009 & Military History 2013). This is not to say that the U.S. is distinctively an empire, 
but to say the notion of a great power being in a “permanent state of war” is not historically 
unprecedented. 
 
Graham and Gregory both see a shift from battlefield to battlespace and in this they conclude that 
some borders have lost their significance while others are strengthened. When the U.S. conducts 
drone strikes in the region of FATA the sovereignty and territory of Pakistan is in a sense ignored. 
Yet is it new that great powers, when they have a purpose, seek to defy other states’ territory - even 
the territory of their allies. 
 
Gregory states that the drone campaign in Pakistan is the first example of the CIA conducting war. 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, the line between what constitutes war and what constitutes 
an intelligence operation is blurred. However, it is empirically difficult, given the secretive nature 
of the CIA, to confirm or deny that the drone-campaign constitutes the “first CIA war” ever 
(Gregory 2011a), as the work of Intelligence Agencies, hereunder the CIA, is, in nature, 
confidential. Whenever the CIA engages in a mission its classification makes information 
concerning it more or less inaccessible to the public and thus its military engagement becomes, at 
best, a public secret. Yet the great engagement of the CIA in the Cold War remains another “public 
secret” and its involvement in regime changes around the globe is undeniable (Betts 02-05-2006). 
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We will argue that these prior regime changes - like the CIA conducted drone strikes in FATA, 
constitute an example of how the CIA uses the world as a - or more precisely “their” - battlespace. 
Although the drone strikes constitute a more visible example of such. 
 
As stated above, the CIA has before engaged in operation on foreign soil with the aim of targeting 
enemies or regime changing, but in the U.S. Global War on Terror the operations of the CIA have 
become less subtle and much more explicit. The drone campaign in FATA is no secret, and as 
described in our analysis, the people of FATA has become used to the sight of drones above them. 
And the very much contested side effect of the drone strikes - the so-called “collateral damage” - is 
making the operation very much present and obvious for the civilians of FATA (Ross, Woods & 
Leo 03-12-2013). 
 
We will argue that what constitutes the real “new” of this so-called “first CIA war” instead lies in it 
comprising the first time the CIA has attained a military hardware which is both highly destructible, 
visibly, and so rare that it directly connects the actions in FATA with an official agent of the U.S. 
because they are not sold around every street-corner and therefore could not be attained by any 
agent? 
Even though the U.S. has tried to deny all relations with the drones found crashed in Pakistan 
(Politiken 24-09-2008), empirical evidence has clearly echoed the drones back to the U.S. and thus, 
to the CIA; had the weapon been an AK47 or a U.S.-produced cruise-missile it would not 
necessarily link back to the official U.S.. So it can be discussed if the “new” in this type of 
“intelligence warfare” is more the measures than it is the means? The drones as military tools are 
difficult to keep secret. And the strikes, especially when hitting the wrong people, are explicit and 
hard to deny. Instead, we argue that the drone strikes are elucidating that the CIA is commanding 
and conducting independent operations, as opposed to the (presumed) shadowy foreign operations 
conducted in the Cold War-era against political “enemies”. 
 
Concerning the notion by both Graham and Gregory of the blur between military and civil society - 
in our project concerning the blurring of the CIA and the Military - we will argue that the division 
of labour in foreign operations has always been blurred. Intelligence is an evident part of the 
command structure constituting a kill-chain as it starts with intelligence-gathering, identifying the 
target(s). And since the CIA’s official mission is to be “[...] the nation’s first line of defense.” 
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(cia.gov 2013), the military is already fusioned in the purpose, and it must be presumed being the 
U.S.’s “first line of defense” involves cooperation with the Military as the government body of 
defense. So when Graham and Gregory describes this way of engaging in war as a “new” type of 
warfare we will argue that it might not be all that new. But it is however evidently clearer for the 
general public, and so it presents itself as something new in the public’s perception.  
 
As seen above, the tendencies evident in the drone-campaign in FATA does very much correlate 
with tendencies evident in the Cold War or other historical events. Hereby it is not our intention to 
completely diminish that the drone-strikes constitute new tendencies in warfare - that the drone 
strikes are nothing more than “old news”. However, we do see that this discussion and historical 
comparisons can shed light upon the perceived “newness” and increase understanding on the 
concept of “new wars” as evident in Pakistan. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this project we have examined whether the ideas of the “New Wars” concept are evident in the 
case of drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan, through the changes in technology, enemy 
conceptualisation, state borders and conductors of war.  
 
The revolution in technology, which we believe the drone campaign in FATA represents, has 
instigated a change in how warfare is conducted; the use of drones has made it possible for the U.S. 
to target its enemies without risking the lives of American soldiers, in territories which are 
otherwise hard to gain access to. Furthermore, the use of drones has significantly shortened the kill-
chain, thus making warfare more efficient. Due to the high-precision strike capabilities of the 
drones, the question is no longer whether the target is hit, but rather whether the target in fact is an 
enemy. The “terrorists” targeted by the drones have no chance of fighting back - and in the case of 
the region of FATA - are very much inferior to the great U.S. machinery behind the drones. In this 
context, the use of drones poses an extreme form of asymmetrical warfare - and represents a new 
form of warfare.  
 
However, while the use of drones undoubtedly has instigated significant changes in the conductance 
of war, there is no simple answer to the question of whether drones have ultimately altered the way 
war is waged to a form of “New War”, or merely constitute a new method of conducting warfare, 
based upon old strategies of war. We stand in the middle of this rapid development which shows no 
sign of slowing down. We believe there are strong indicators that drones are going to change 
warfare, if they are given the adequate time. 
The  concept of the enemy constitutes the very basis on which war is legitimised. “New Wars” are 
fought between a mixture of state and non-state actors and the concept of the enemy is thus no 
longer state-defined, but is centered on a strong differentiation amongst “them” and “us” , based on 
a vague notion of having the wrong ideas, beliefs or identity. There is a paradox in that the enemy 
constitutes such a central aspect in legitimising the drone strikes while the concept of the enemy 
remains equally blurred; when the enemy is a non-state actor, it is difficult to distinguish the actual 
enemy from the rest of civil society. The U.S. concept of the enemy is vague to an extent that it 
becomes applicable to anyone who is perceived to be a threat to “us”. 
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This notion is evident in FATA, where society is not easily divided into categories of “civilians”, 
“militants”, “insurgents” and “terrorists” - in black and white. This conceptualisation of the enemy 
implicates that the whole of FATA is perceived and treated as a potential threat. This is clearly 
evident through the signature strikes which target people whom, according to certain established 
parameters, are assumed to be “terrorists”; because, in a society which in general is considered 
hostile, how is the “terroristic” nature ascertained? 
 
The supposed change in the concept of what constitutes the enemy is one of the characteristics of 
“New Wars”, and we have found that it aligns with the context of the drone strikes in FATA.  
However, we do not believe that the importance of states in defining what constitutes the enemy can 
be completely taken out of the equation even though warfare is no longer characterised by state-on -
state wars; the concept/strategy of creating enemy pictures is not a direct consequence of a new type 
of warfare. We have argued that it is an “old” war strategy which we for instance have seen being 
used during the Cold War, where the Communists were perceived to be the everywhere enemy - 
comparable to today’s notion of “terrorists”. We have also argued that within the notion of “weak 
states”, the threat imposed from non-state actors is aligned with the state, because these states are 
simply perceived to be more exposed to terrorism, as is the case with FATA, Pakistan. In this 
context, states still play an important role in defining what constitutes the enemy. 
 
Along with the “New War”´s notion that the concept of the enemy has changed and is no longer 
believed to be state-centered, lies a notion that state borders have lost their importance while new 
“borders” occur in other places such as airports and train stations. War is thus no longer fought in a 
well-defined battlefield, but can potentially erupt everywhere, because when the battlespace is 
defined by the presence of an “elusive” enemy, everything becomes a site of “permanent 
war”(Gregory 2011a: 240). Even though the Pakistani Government considers the U.S. drone 
campaign to be a violation of the state’s sovereignty, the U.S. has not seized the conductance of the 
contested strikes which, with only few exceptions, are centered in the region of FATA. Within the 
context of “New Wars”, FATA has thus become a Battlespace in the U.S War on Terror, because 
the U.S. considers FATA to be a safe haven for “terrorists” and the Pakistani state fails to prevent it. 
FATA is then rendered a “legitimate” target in the name of “homeland security”.  
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We argue that Pakistan's perceived inability to exercise its sovereignty in FATA cannot be reduced 
to a question of incapability or unwillingness, but that FATA´s complexity has to be taken into 
consideration. The region has served as a buffer-zone throughout history, and we believe that it still 
constitutes such; the Durand Line does not reflect the reality of the people living in the area and it is 
thus not regarded as important, and the administrative system is the same as in colonial times. These 
factors have marginalised FATA from the rest of Pakistan and serve to explain why the area is 
perceived to be “lawless” in the eyes of the U.S. and thus a battlespace.  
 
We however question if the contours of war have ever been distinct notions of battlefields, defined 
by two armies in uniforms, as we find that past wars always have entailed some involvement of the 
entire society. Moreover, we also question the newness in the notion of permanent never-ending 
battlespace; we argue that the same phenomenon is applicable to the Cold War, where the sovereign 
borders within the East and West lost importance while an imaginative border dividing the East and 
West- block took form. While we do not find that the “New Wars” notions of battlespace constitute 
a change in warfare, we believe that the notion has become more evident with the increase of 
surveillance- technology. 
 
We find that one of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. drone campaign in FATA, is that it is 
conducted by the CIA. This aspect of the concept of “New Wars” entails a blurring of the line 
between military and civil society. As basis of what is regarded as the first CIA war in history lies 
the paradigm of “virtuous war”; the notion of a sensitive and surgical war, where the identifying, 
locating and targeting process is rendered purely technical, and through which it is possible to 
eliminate the enemies with a minimum of collateral damage by conducting “surgical strikes”. 
 
We have argued that an implication of the CIA conducting the drone-campaign is that it becomes a 
“war without war”, in the sense that it comprises all the characteristics of a conventional military 
operation, besides being conducted by the military, and that both the U.S. and Pakistan deny there is 
a war. Apart from the widely contested legality of this arrangement, based on the assumption that 
the CIA, being strictly an Intelligence agency does not have the legal mandate to take on military 
operations, another effect of a war led by an Intelligence Agency is a lack of transparency; as the 
CIA is shrouded in secrecy, their conductance of military operations raises a fundamental problem 
of accountability and lack of official information regarding the drone-campaign - and for the people 
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in FATA this (not so) secret war led by Intelligence has another consequence in that survivors of 
drone strikes are not compensated in any way. We have argued that since the drone-campaign does 
not constitute a war, it is then to be regarded as a foreign policy tool; in this light, the drone strikes 
are similar to the very “terrorists” they are targeting. 
 
Whether the drone-campaign in fact is the first example of  CIA engaging in military operations is 
difficult to conclude with certainty, given the confidentiality of CIA. We however argue that this 
blurring of the line between the military and civil society is not altogether new, as seen in CIA´s 
previous involvement in regime changes around the globe, but that the drone is just a too explicit 
and destructive military hardware to be kept out of the public eye. 
 
Examining the tendencies of “New War” as evident in the drone strikes in FATA have made us 
question “Is this really new”? It seems evident that the technology of drones enables an actor of war 
to kill enemies without putting himself at risk, alters the way in which war is led, but also that war 
roughly remains the same. Perhaps the drone strikes are examples of a warfare utilising new 
methods, but not new objectives? 
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Chapter 8: Discussion of findings 
 
Our project has centered around the theoretical notions of “New Wars” and we have applied these 
notions to the drone strikes in FATA, Pakistan as an evidence of same. However, we have through 
the production of this project discovered other ways of approaching drones and the events in 
Pakistan which we are sure would provide fulfilling analysis to further highlight the line of events. 
 
Even though drones constitute a new aspect of warfare, they have already become an increasingly 
important part of the so-called 4th generation of warfare. The U.S. now has over 8000 drones 
(Singer 2013) and is currently training more drone pilots than actual pilots (Zakaria 2013). 
Furthermore, currently 75 countries are developing their own drone programmes (Michaels 2013), 
showing that the usage of drones is on the rise. Drones are also being used in other contexts than 
military. As Gregory mentions in “The everywhere war”, drones are already being used in border 
patrols (Gregory 2011a), showing that they are most applicable for police work and private use. 
This is also a tendency which indicates that the future has much to show regarding how widespread 
this technology will become. The future “invasion” of drones in both military and civil society will 
probably also bring different sorts of frameworks on strategies for the employment of drones. In this 
regard, we argue that our findings can help contributing to such framework as it touches upon some 
fundamental aspects of what constitutes the military usage of drones.  
 
We have not in the project examined what consequences the drones hold for the law of wars. We 
are sure that the question of how drones are incorporated in the development new laws and/or 
shaping current, will constitute an area of importance in international law forthwith, as law is 
created through the implementation of new ways of conducting war, and the fact that drones are 
unmanned war machineries probably will leave international law with questions unanswered. 
Another country that has been using drones as lethal weapons is the state of Israel. They are utilised 
particularly in the occupied Palestinian territories (Bloomfield 05-05-2013). 
 
 It would indeed be interesting to compare how drones are used by the U.S. to the strategies and 
technique employed by Israel, and also to see whether any comparison exists between how drones 
are utilised against Palestinians by Israel and against the population of FATA by the U.S.  
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We have in the discussion compared the drone-campaign in FATA with historical events centered 
around great powers. It could be interesting to see the drone-campaign instead of through the lenses 
of “New Wars”, as a part of the narrative of U.S. neo-imperialism - a larger campaign of spreading 
the U.S. “way of life” and securing the U.S.’ hegemonic positioning globally. This would indeed be 
both relevant and gain insights into the way drones are used and the U.S. “way” of conducting war. 
 
Also, the political situation in Pakistan surrounding the U.S.-conducted drone strikes is an area 
which, had we been given more time and pages, would have been drawn further into the project. 
Wikileaks documents show that the Pakistani government in August 2008 agreed on further drone 
strikes in FATA (Guardian 30-11-2010). However, they have on April 2012 demanded the 
immediate cessation of any of the U.S. drones strikes on Pakistani territory (National Assembly of 
Pakistan 12-4-2012). What will the consequences of this demand be and how will Pakistan’s future 
policies be shaped around the drone strikes on Pakistani soil? This also holds consequences for the 
region of FATA itself; both will be topics worth taking notice of. 
 
Three days before the deadline of this project, President Barack Obama held a speech at the 
National Defense University in Washington D.C where he approached the issue of drones in 
combat-use. He gave no comments on a prospect for seizing their use in Pakistan. However, what 
this speech will probably become most known for is that Obama declared that the Global War on 
Terror is coming to an end (Burcharth 24-05-2013). If this really happens, it will pose serious 
consequences for the U.S. foreign policy and military operations, the parts of the world affected by 
the U.S. foreign policies, and therefore also the drone-campaign as utilised in FATA. Furthermore it 
will be interesting to see what this change in U.S. policy will mean for the concept of “New Wars”. 
Since many of the theoretical assumptions of Graham and Gregory are based upon the geopolitical 
situation of the Global War on Terror, a change in U.S. policy could affect some of the assumptions 
of “New Wars”.  
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